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Be Smart & Stay Safe
IN SERVICE: 10!8
Volume 12 Issue 2 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms became law 
on April 17, 1982. That was 30 years ago. Since then the 
Courts, in applying  and interpreting  the Charter, have tried 
to tell government and its actors (including  the police) 
where exactly the boundaries of an individual’s rights and 
the countervailing  societal interest in effective law 
enforcement intersect. This is no easy task. Equally, if not 
more difficult, is applying  the law to the facts. But that is 
exactly what the police must do. It is their duty to take 
abstract constitutional notions and pinciples (such as 
privacy) and apply them to daily reality, often in a moments notice, with little time for reflection, second 
opinion or timeouts. The call you make is the one we all must live with. Training  and education is key! 
That is why “In Service: 10-8” is now entering  its 12th year of publication. We salute all of our readers 
and thank them for all that they do in maintaining law and order is this great nation we call Canada.
Happy Birthday!!!
Charter Turns 30
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Forthwith Usually Requires A Prompt Demand & An 
Immediate Response
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Border Request To Exit Vehicle Not A Disguised 
Sobriety Test
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Driving Intent Not Required For De Facto ‘Care Or 
Control’
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Finding Gun Was A Valid Objective Of Search 21
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27
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Unless otherwise noted all articles are 
authored by Mike Novakowski, MA, LLM. The 
articles contained herein are provided for 
information purposes only and are not to be 
construed as legal or other professional 
advice. The opinions expressed herein are not 
necessarily the opinions of the Justice Institute 
of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to 
this newsletter. If you would like to be added 
to our electronic distribution list e-mail Mike 
Novakowski at mnovakowski@jibc.ca.
Graduate Certificates
Intelligence Analysis
or 
Tactical Criminal 
Analysis
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POLICE LEADERSHIP 
APRIL 7-9, 2013
Mark your calendars. 
The British Columbia 
Association of Chiefs 
of Police, the Ministry 
of Public Safety and 
Solicitor General, and 
the Justice Institute of 
B r i t i sh Co lumbia 
Police Academy are hosting the Police Leadership 
2013 Conference in Vancouver, British Columbia. 
This is Canada’s largest police leadership 
conference and will provide an opportunity for 
delegates to discuss leadership topics presented 
by world renowned speakers.
“Staying Connected in a Changing World”
www.policeleadershipconference.com
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of it’s 
most recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Are you ready?: how to prepare for an 
earthquake.
Maggie Mooney.
Vancouver, BC: Greystone Books, 2011.
HV 599 M66 2011
Business communicat ion: communicate 
effectively in any business environment.
Marty Brounstein, Arthur H. Bell, Dayle M. Smith; 
with Connie Isbell.
Toronto, ON: Wiley Pathways, 2010.
HF 5718 B744 2010 
Conceptual blockbusting: a guide to better ideas.
James L. Adams.
Cambridge, MA: Perseus Pub., c2001.
BF 441 A28 2001
Domestic violence prevention and reduction in 
British Columbia (2000-2010).
prepared by Katherine R. Rossiter.
New Westminster, BC: JIBC, 2011.
HV 6626.23 C3 R62 2011
The element:  how finding  your passion changes 
everything.
Ken Robinson with Lou Aronica.
New York, NY: Penguin Group USA, 2009.
BF 637 S4 R592 2009
T h e e t h n i c i t y r e a d e r : n a t i o n a l i s m , 
multiculturalism and migration.
edited by Montserrat Guibernau and John Rex.
Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity, 2010.
GN 495.6 E895 2010
First steps: a guide to social research.
Michael Del Balso, Alan D. Lewis.
Toronto, ON: Nelson Education, c2012.
H 62 D45 2011
The fifth agreement: a practical  guide to self-
mastery.
Miguel Ruiz and Jose Ruiz; with Janet Mills.
San Rafael, CA: Amber-Allen Pub.: Distributed by 
Hay House, 2010.
BJ 1581.2 R85 2010
Get your loved one sober:  alternatives to 
nagging, pleading, and threatening.
Robert J. Meyers, Brenda L. Wolfe.
Center City, MN: Hazelden, c2004.
HV 5278 M28 2004
How to measure anything:  finding  the value of 
"intangibles" in business.
Douglas W. Hubbard.
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, c2010.
HF 5681 I55 H83 2010
Good boss, bad boss:  how to be the best - and 
learn from the worst.
Robert I. Sutton.
New York, NY: Business Plus, c2010.
HF 5549.12 S88 2010
Investigating harassment in the workplace.
Malcolm J. Mackillop, Jamie Knight, Meighan Ferris-
Miles.
Toronto, ON: Carswell, 2011.
HF 5549.5 E43 M33 2011
Many faces of posttraumatic stress disorder. 
Susan Rau Stocker.
Uniontown, OH: Holy Macro! Books, c2010.
RC 552 P67 S76 2010
The mindful workplace:  developing  resilient 
individuals and  resonant organizations with 
MBSR. Michael Chaskalson.
Chichester, West Sussex; Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2011.
RC 489 M55 C43 2011
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Out of our minds: learning to be creative.
Sir Ken Robinson.
Oxford: Capstone, c2011.
BF 408 R53 2011
Personal space: the behavioral basis of design. 
Robert Sommer.
Bristol: Bosko Books, 2007.
BF 469 S64 2007
Positive psychology at work:  how positive 
leadership and appreciative inquiry create 
inspiring organizations.
Sarah Lewis.
Chichester, West Sussex; Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2011.
HD 57.7 L49 2011
Preventing  stress in organizations: how to 
develop positive managers.
Emma Donaldson-Feilder, Joanna Yarker, and Rachel 
Lewis.
Chichester, West Sussex, UK; Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2011.
HF 5548.85 D66 2011
Psychological illness, mental  health and the 
workplace: Canadian trends and return to work 
challenges.
Jane E. Sleeth.
Toronto, ON: Carswell, c2011.
RC 967.5 S45 2011
Research strategies:  finding  your way through the 
information fog.
William B. Badke.
Bloomington, IN: IUniverse, Inc., 2011.
Z 710 B23 2011
The role of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
during the Indian residential school system.
by Marcel-Eugène LeBeuf on behalf of the RCMP.
Ottawa, ON: Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 
c2011.
E 96.2 L46 2011
Situated learning perspectives.
Hilary McLellan, editor.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Educational Technology 
Publications, c1996.
LB 1060 S58 1996
Statistics for dummies.
by Deborah J. Rumsey.
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, c2011.
HA 29 R84 2011
Success built to last: creating a life that matters.
Jerry Porras, Stewart Emery, Mark Thompson.
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Wharton School Pub., 
c2007.
HF 5386 P757 2007
Surviving  your divorce:  a guide to Canadian 
family law.
Michael G. Cochrane.
Mississauga, ON: J. Wiley & Sons Canada, [2011], 
c2012.
KE 569.2 C624 2011
"This is a man's problem": strategies for working 
with South Asian  male perpetrators of intimate 
partner violence.
Gary Thandi, with Bethan Lloyd.
New Westminster, BC: JIBC, 2011.
 HQ 1090.7 I4 T55 2011
Toxic divorce: a workbook for alienated parents. 
Kathleen M. Reay.
Penticton, BC: Dr. Kathleen M. Reay Inc., c2011.
RJ 506 P27 R43 2011
The volunteer management handbook: leadership 
strategies for success.
edited by Tracy Daniel Connors.
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, c2012.
HN 90 V64 V65 2012
Why people fail:  the 16 obstacles to success and 
how you can overcome them.
Siimon Reynolds.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, c2012.
BF 575 F14 R49 2012
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WARRANT, PLUS BRIEFING, 
PROVIDES GROUNDS FOR 
WARRANTLESS ARREST
R. v. Charles, 2012 SKCA 34 !! !! !! !! !! !! 
!
An Ontario Justice of the Peace issued 
a warrant commanding  Ontario 
peace officers to arrest the accused 
for two counts of attempted murder 
and one count of conspiracy to 
commit murder. When arrested, the accused was to 
be brought before a judge in Ontario. Because the 
accused was in Saskatchewan, two OPP  officers 
went there and asked Saskatoon police to assist in 
executing  the warrant, which had not been endorsed 
by a justice in Saskatchewan. The OPP  showed the 
Saskatchewan officers the warrant, said it was 
“Canada-wide” and briefed them for an hour about 
the circumstances of the charges. Saskatchewan 
police spotted the accused in the driver’s seat of a 
parked vehicle. As they approached him, he leaned 
over to the passenger side and then looked back at 
the officers. He was arrested and the vehicle was 
searched. Police found a loaded semi-automatic 
handgun with a defaced serial number under the 
passenger floor mat. The accused was charged with 
several weapons offences related to the gun.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
Saskatchewan officers testified they intended to 
arrest the accused on the warrant. But they also said 
the warrant, plus the briefing  they received, 
provided them with reasonable and probable 
grounds for the arrest. The trial judge found the 
arrest unlawful because the Saskatchewan officers 
relied on the warrant to effect the arrest. It was not a 
“Canada-wide” warrant as described by the Ontario 
officers. The warrant had not been issued by a 
superior court nor was it endorsed in Saskatchewan; 
therefore it could only be executed in Ontario. In 
the judge’s view, “the arrest clearly was done on the 
strength of a judicial warrant ... , not on the basis of 
reasonable and probable grounds to arrest.” Since 
the arrest was unlawful, the judge concluded the 
accused’s ss. 8  (unreasonable search and seizure) 
and 9 (arbitrary detention) Charter rights were 
breached. The evidence of the gun was excluded 
and the accused was acquitted of all charges. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The Crown argued the arrest was actually 
warrantless and authorized by s. 495(1) of the 
Criminal Code, with the police relying  on the fact of 
the warrant and the other information obtained 
during  the briefing  to provide reasonable and 
probable grounds that the accused had committed 
the indictable offence or offences detailed in the 
warrant. The Crown submitted that the phrase 
“Canada-wide” warrant (which is not found in the 
Criminal Code) was not used to indicate that the 
warrant could be executed anywhere in Canada, but 
rather that the issuing  province was willing  to pay 
the expenses for having  the accused transported 
back to its jurisdiction. The accused would then be 
taken before a judge in the arresting  jurisdiction 
(Saskatchewan) to await formal endorsement of the 
warrant, which would permit the arrestee’s return to 
the issuing jurisdiction (Ontario). 
!
Justice Smith, delivering  the Court of Appeal’s 
decision, found it was unnecessary to decide 
whether the existence of a warrant itself, issued for 
an indictable offence, was sufficient to constitute 
reasonable and probable grounds for an arrest. In 
this case, Saskatchewan police had considerable 
information about the circumstances of the offences. 
This knowledge went well beyond the mere 
existence of the extra-jurisdictional warrant. They 
were briefed by the OPP  and knew all the facts 
relied upon by Ontario police in obtaining  the 
warrant. “These facts, especially when coupled with 
the existence of the arrest warrant based on these 
facts, clearly provided objectively reasonable and 
probable grounds for the arresting  officers to believe 
that the [accused] had committed indictable 
offences.” said Justice Smith. “Moreover, both 
arresting  officers, in their testimony, made it clear 
“These facts, especially when coupled with the existence of the arrest warrant based on 
these facts, clearly provided objectively reasonable and probable grounds for the arresting 
officers to believe that the [accused] had committed indictable offences.” !
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that they held a subjective belief that they had 
reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest.” 
Even though the warrant was not endorsed in 
Saskatchewan and the arresting  officers were 
mistaken that it was effective there, the warrantless 
arrest was valid under s.! 495(1). Once an arrest is 
made under s. 495(1) on reasonable grounds, the 
Criminal Code has a procedure (s. 503(3)) for 
executing  the warrant after the arrest provided the 
warrant is presented for endorsement at that stage.
The trial judge erred by assuming  knowledge of the 
circumstances relating  to the charges in Ontario 
could not meet the objective test for reasonable and 
probable grounds because this information was 
secondhand or hearsay. “The police are entitled to 
rely on hearsay information to provide reasonable 
and probable grounds for arrest, so long  as that 
information is reasonably reliable,” said Justice 
Smith. “Information provided to the Saskatchewan 
officers by the Ontario police was clearly from a 
reliable source. In addition, the existence of the 
warrant for arrest based on that information 
enhanced its credibility.” Further, the trial judge 
mistakenly concluded that police did not 
subjectively believe they had reasonable and 
probable grounds for the arrest because they said 
they would not have arrested the accused had there 
been no warrant. Both officers actually testified they 
believed they had reasonable grounds that the 
accused had committed the offences detailed in the 
warrant. 
The arrest was valid under s. 495(1). Both officers 
subjectively believed that they had reasonable 
grounds the accused had committed the indictable 
offences detailed in the warrant. This subjective 
belief was based on the briefing  they had received 
from the Ontario officers, supplemented by the 
existence of the Ontario arrest warrant. Their belief 
was also objectively reasonable. There was no s. 9 
Charter violation. Since the arrest was lawful, the 
search of the vehicle was reasonable as an incident 
to arrest and no s. 8 breach arose. The Crown’s 
appeal was allowed, the evidence was admissible, 
the accused’s acquittals were set aside and a new 
trial was ordered.  
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
ENTRAPMENT BURDEN LIES ON 
ACCUSED
Stoyko, 2012 ABCA 90
Two undercover police officers went 
to the accused’s home to buy 
marijuana. When he answered the 
door, the officers told him they had 
met someone at the bar the night 
be fo re who said he could sell them marijuana. 
The accused invited the officers inside, asked a few 
questions about who had referred them and then 
sold them a half ounce of marijuana for $180. The 
accused also gave the officers his cell phone number 
when they asked if they could buy marijuana again 
in the future. Twelve days later the officers returned 
and bought another half ounce of marijuana. A 
search warrant for the accused’s home was 
subsequently obtained and a small amount of 
marijuana was seized.
!
Alberta Provincial Court
At his trial the accused admitted he sold the 
marihuana but argued he was entrapped by the 
aggressive and intimidating  conduct of the police 
during  their unexpected visit to his home. The trial 
judge rejected this argument and the accused was 
convicted of trafficking. 
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused broadened the scope of his entrapment 
argument by claiming  that the police engaged in 
random virtue testing  when they attempted to solicit 
drugs from him. In his view, the police had no basis 
to target him for the purchase of marijuana. But 
there was no evidence to support this. Justice Martin, 
speaking  for the Court of Appeal, noted that the 
police officers were never asked to explain why they 
chose to target the accused. They simply said they 
were directed to him by the officer in charge of the 
investigation. Since the accused did not call or elicit 
evidence in advancing  an entrapment defence, he 
failed to meet the burden of proof which rested on 
him to prove, not the Crown to disprove. Since there 
was no evidence to support the entrapment defence, 
it had no air of reality to it. The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
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NO REASON TO DOUBT POSTAL 
EMPLOYEE’S VERACITY: 
WARRANT UPHELD
R. v. Whalen, 2012 NBCA 20
A Canada Post employee discovered 
two envelopes containing  drugs. 
They had been deposited in the mail 
but were not properly sealed. The 
employee reported her observations 
which eventually formed the basis for a warrant to 
search the accused’s home. When the warrant was 
executed, police found incriminating  evidence 
proving  the accused’s involvement in an elaborate 
scheme for the exportation and trafficking  of 
cannabis through the mail.  
New Brunswick Provincial Court
The trial judge accepted the Canada Post employee’s 
evidence that the envelopes accidentally opened, 
exposing  their  contents. The judge concluded that 
the postal employee did not open the envelopes, but 
that the contents had inadvertently spilled out. He 
found the warrant valid and the accused was 
convicted of unlawfully producing  marihuana, 
possession for the purpose of trafficking, unlawfully 
exporting  it from Canada and trafficking. He was 
sentenced to four years in prison, less 405 days 
spent in remand, plus ancillary orders under the 
Criminal Code. 
New Brunswick Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his conviction, suggesting 
that the trial judge erred in upholding  the validity of 
the search warrant. In his view, the evidence 
obtained as a result of the warrant was inadmissible. 
The test to be applied when determining  the validity 
of a warrant is “whether, in the totality of the 
circumstances as set out in the Information to 
Obtain (the "ITO") and the inferences that could 
properly be drawn, the issuing  judge could have 
been satisfied that reasonable grounds existed.” In 
this case, the trial judge ruled “there was some 
evidence in the ITO upon which the issuing  judge 
could rely to issue the warrant.” The Court of Appeal 
continued:
This was not a case of a confidential or 
anonymous informant, which might have caused 
the police to make further investigation. Rather, 
the police had information from a known 
witness in circumstances in which there was no 
reason to doubt i ts veracity. In these 
circumstances, it was incumbent upon the 
police to make a full, fair and frank disclosure in 
drafting  the ITO, but it was not necessary for the 
officers to investigate further as to the credibility 
of the postal worker. [para. 6]
Nor was it necessary to consider postal inspection 
powers under the Canada Post Corporation Act or its 
regulations. The employee did not inspect the 
envelopes; the contents inadvertently spilled out. 
Since the warrant was valid, the search was 
reasonable and there was no need to undertake a s. 
24(2) Charter  analysis. But, even if the ITO was 
defective, the police were acting  in good faith on 
information they believed credible and under a 
warrant they expected was valid. The evidence 
would have been nonetheless admissible. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
STAY FOR CHARTER BREACH IS 
AN EXCEPTIONAL REMEDY
R. v. Salisbury, 2012 SKCA 32 !! !! !! !! !! ! 
!
The accused’s driving  caught the 
attention of a police officer in the 
early morning. It was extremely cold, 
-47° Celsius with the wind chill. He 
was stopped and arrested at 4:18 am 
and subsequently provided two breath samples of 
180mg% starting  at 4:40 am. He was then placed in 
a cell whereupon he fell asleep.! He thought he 
awoke sometime between 8:00 am and 10:00 am 
but was not released until shortly before 2:00 pm. 
He was charged with impaired driving  and over 
80mg%. !
!
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The trial judge! stayed the charges. In her view, the 
accused had been arbitrarily detained under s. 9 of 
the Charter.!She found that after 7:30 am there was 
no evidence that the continued detention was 
Volume 12 Issue 2 ! March/April 2012
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necessary. She rejected a lesser sentence or 
monetary compensation as an appropriate remedy 
because they would not ensure future Charter 
compliance by the police. On the other hand, a stay, 
she opined, would (i) adequately adjust the wrong 
suffered by the accused, (ii) attempt to secure future 
compliance by the police with an accused’s 
constitutional rights and (iii) would not bring  the 
administration of justice into disrepute. 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
The Crown’s appeal was successful. The appeal 
judge upheld the Charter violation but found the 
remedy of a stay was disproportionate to the breach. 
He set aside the stay of proceedings and remitted the 
matter to the trial judge to conclude the trial.
!
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The accused asked that the stay be reinstated. The 
Court of Appeal, however, concluded the Charter 
breach in this case did not warrant such an extreme 
remedy. “A stay of proceedings as a remedy for a 
Charter breach is an exceptional remedy to be used 
only in the clearest of cases,” said Justice Lane, 
delivering  the Court’s opinion. In agreeing  that the 
appeal judge was correct in finding  the stay 
disproportionate to the breach, he continued:
The Char te r b reach in the par t icu la r 
circumstances was not such as to warrant such 
an extreme remedy.! The [accused] twice 
registered .18. He himself says he did not wake 
up until between 8:00 and 10:00 a.m.!  That of 
itself is in the circumstances a significantly wide 
range.!The fact he was not checked on after 7:30 
a.m. does not extend the overholding time as the 
trial judge did. Further, it would be some 
considerable period of t ime given his 
breathalyzer readings before he could be 
released unless he had someone to pick him up 
and, in this case, he gave a rural address nor did 
he ask to be picked up.![para. 10]
!
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
GARBAGE ABANDONED: 
NO PRIVACY VIOLATION
R. v. Lewis, 2012 NLCA 11
!
Three armed and masked men, one 
armed with a hand gun, violently 
broke and entered a home, !robbing 
and injuring  its two occupants. The 
female victim had the gun placed at 
her head while her husband was beat with a claw 
hammer. The accused, who did not actually enter 
the home, was a party to the offence by providing 
the home invaders with the knowledge of where the 
money was kept. He had been to the home at least 
twice before and paid for the taxi used to transport 
all four of them to the residence, conduct a drive-by 
and confirm that it was the right place for the plan to 
continue. As part of the investigation, police seized 
three garbage bags and their contents from an 
uncovered (no lid) plastic garbage container that was 
about a foot or two from the city sidewalk near the 
rented residential premises in which the accused 
lived with his mother. The container was located 
adjacent to, but just inside, the property boundary. 
There was no fence between the residential property 
line and the sidewalk. The garbage bags contained 
blood stained clothes and a piece of paper with the 
address of the home broken into. As a result of this, 
and other evidence, the accused was charged with 
several offences including  break and enter, breach of 
probation and breach of recognizance. !
!
Newfoundland Supreme Court
The trial judge concluded that the garbage container 
was approximately 1.7 feet inside the property 
line.! He noted that it was “about as far away from 
the entrance to the residence as it could be placed 
without being  on or outside the property line.! This 
would seem to be a place where the garbage would 
have been customarily located for removal.”!Having 
presumed the accused had a subjective expectation 
of privacy, the judge ruled the expectation was not 
objectively reasonable. “The garbage bucket was 
placed at almost the extreme boundary of the 
property close to a busy, combined, commercial and 
residential street, in full view and with easy access 
by the public or any other interested life form, for 
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example, dogs, cats, gulls or crows, the garbage 
bucket had no lid on it nor was it itself in any 
restraint box or system,” said the judge. “It was open 
to anybody interested in it, including  scavengers or, 
as in this case, the police.” He continued:
!
I find as a fact that on the evidence and viewed 
in all of the circumstances, the seized garbage 
had been abandoned and it was open to the 
police to seize it as part of their ongoing 
investigation.! I find that the police intrusion by 
stepping on the property was a technical trespass 
of such a minimum nature as to make the 
intrusion into the lives of the residents of 189A 
negligible.
!
The accused did not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the seized garbage. He was convicted 
and, after considering  remand time, was sentenced 
to eight years in prison. !
Newfoundland Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the trial judge erred in 
admitting, among  other evidence, the contents of the 
garbage bags. In his view, his rights under s. 8  of the 
Charter had been breached because the garbage had 
not been placed at the curb at a time convenient for 
pick-up in accordance with the city by-law. 
Therefore, he contended that it had not yet been 
abandoned. He submitted that the evidence should 
have been excluded under s. 24(2). !!
!
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
!
Even assuming, as the trial judge did, that the 
accused had a subjective expectation of privacy in 
the bags of garbage, the Court of Appeal agreed that 
the privacy expectation was not objectively 
reasonable. Here, the accused abandoned the 
material. He had discarded the garbage, thereby 
giving  up any expectation of privacy he may 
otherwise have had in it. The trial judge did not err 
and the evidence was properly admitted. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
DETENTION DID NOT ARISE 
DURING ‘MR. BIG’ SCENARIO
R. v. Earhart, 2011 BCCA 490
The accused was arrested for the 
second degree murder of her 
common law spouse and admitted to 
strangling  him. She was released on 
$3,000 bail, required to report to a 
bail supervisor, disclose her address, refrain from 
possessing  any weapons and abide by a curfew. 
After her release, police obtained a wiretap 
authorization, installed a tracking  device in her 
vehicle and monitored her movements. Although 
she breached her curfew, she was not arrested 
because police wanted to maintain the viability of 
surveillance. To further their investigation, police 
initiated a “Mr. Big” undercover operation, 
engineering  scenarios to gain the accused’s trust. As 
part of this operation the accused was invited out for 
dinner, then up to a hotel room for a job interview. 
The room was equipped with audio-video 
equipment. The undercover operator asked the 
accused about the murder under the pretence that 
he could make the charges against her “go away”. 
She admitted she planned the victim’s murder but 
did not execute it.! She was then arrested and 
charged with first degree murder, remanded in 
custody and again interviewed. Subsequently, she 
confessed her involvement in the murder. 
British Columbia Supreme Court
At trial the accused alleged, in part, that the her s. 7 
Charter right to silence was breached because the 
police used tricks and deceit to elicit the statements 
during  the undercover operation. Plus, since she was 
on bail for the investigated offence, she contended 
that she was under the control of the state and thus 
detained. The Crown, on the other hand, suggested 
that the s. 7 right to silence was only triggered on 
detention. Since she was not detained, nor in a 
position that was the functional equivalent of a 
detention, s. 7 did not apply. The judge ruled that 
when the accused made the statement during  the 
undercover operation she was not “a person in the 
power of the state requiring  the protection of her s. 7 
right to silence.” The accused’s statements and the 
view archives at
www.10-8.ca
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recording  were admissible and she was convicted of 
first degree murder by a jury. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused again submitted that she was detained 
when she spoke to police during  the undercover 
operation. In her view, police manipulated her 
movements while on judicial interim release which 
amounted to the functional equivalent of a 
detention. Thus, her a s.7 right to silence was 
breached.! Furthermore, she contended that there 
should be a new approach in assessing  the 
admissibility of statements arising  from “Mr. Big” 
scenarios. The Crown, in contrast, suggested that the 
right to silence was not engaged because a person 
on judicial interim release is not detained, 
functionally or in actuality.!
Right to Silence - Charter s. 7
Justice Bennett, writing  the Court of Appeal’s 
decision, concluded that the right to silence did not 
extend to the accused, who had been arrested, 
charged with an offence and then released on 
judicial interim release. The terms of her release 
were not onerous, nor was she under “pronounced 
psychological and emotional pressure” when she 
spoke with the undercover operator. “This ‘Mr. Big’ 
operation was relatively benign, and there was no 
physical or psychological constraint imposed on [the 
accused] by the police,” said Justice Bennett.! “She 
was free to agree or decline to speak to the 
undercover operator.” The trial judge did not err in 
concluding there was no detention. 
!
“Mr. Big” Operations
The Court of Appeal was unwilling  to adopt a new 
approach for determining  the admissibility of 
confessions from suspects in the context of “Mr. Big” 
operations, which were described as follows:
The plan generally involves undercover officers 
convincing a suspect to join a criminal 
organization. The suspect is eventually 
introduced to the crime boss, who often 
professes the influence and ability to internally 
resolve the suspect’s murder charge. The 
circumstances of these operations vary 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y f r o m i n v e s t i g a t i o n t o 
investigation.!Some are very lengthy and purport 
to involve the suspect in increasingly serious 
criminal activity.! In some, the suspect is led to 
perceive serious threats and assaults perpetrated 
upon other members of the “gang” if they fail to 
meet expectations.! In others, the scenario put 
forward is less menacing, involving  only offers of 
employment in the criminal organization 
conditional upon reassurance that the suspect’s 
background will not cause problems for the 
organization.!If so, the crime boss will take care 
of it. 
Concerns about this investigative technique have 
been raised for some time.! Those concerns are 
that a suspect who is brought into the criminal 
underworld will be so intimidated or so keen to 
impress the crime boss that he or she will falsely 
confess to a crime.! [references omitted, para. 
79-80]
“Mr. Big” statements are considered contextually by 
a court.! The Court of Appeal found this “Mr. Big” 
scenario fell on the less oppressive end of the scale 
when compared to others in the case law. It was 
limited to dinner and a 30-minute discussion in the 
hotel room. There were no serious concerns 
regarding  the reliability of the statements due to 
oppression, intimidation or other tactics likely to 
shock the community. The statement was properly 
admitted and the accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
“MR. BIG” JURY INSTRUCTION
“I want to tell you about confessions.!They can 
be unreliable. People can be persuaded to 
utter what amounts to a false confession for a 
number of reasons.! You may think people do 
not confess to things they did not do, but that 
is not the case.!The criminal justice system is 
all too aware of the fact that people have been 
known to confess to things they have not 
done.! People have been known to make false 
confessions out of fear, out of hope, or 
promise, or favour.! Do not start with the 
premise that people only confess to crimes 
they have actually committed.”  
BC Supreme Court Justice as cited in R. v. Earhart, 2011 BCCA 490
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FORTHWITH USUALLY REQUIRES 
A PROMPT DEMAND & AN 
IMMEDIATE RESPONSE
R.!v.!Quansah,!2012 ONCA 123
!
A police officer saw a stopped 
vehicle facing  a green light at 3:03 
am. The accused was sitting  in the 
driver’s seat with his eyes closed. 
While trying  to wake him up, the 
officer observed that the accused’s eyes were red 
and bloodshot.!The accused drove away and police 
pursued, but he pulled over shortly thereafter. He 
was ordered out of the vehicle and handcuffed. The 
police noted he was unsteady on his feet, his breath 
smelled of alcohol, and his eyes were red, 
unfocused and glossy.! Between 3:06 am and 3:17 
am a limited search for weapons was conducted and 
a short conversation ensued about alcohol 
consumption.! The accused also said someone else 
was in the car, which was found to be incorrect. At 
3:17 am an approved screening  device (ASD) 
demand under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code was 
made. The ASD was demonstrated at 3:20 am and, 
after two insufficient samples, a fail reading  was 
obtained at 3:22 am. The accused was arrested, 
provided his rights, cautioned and given an 
Intoxilyzer breath demand. He was transported to 
the police station, spoke to a lawyer, provided two 
breath samples (126mg% and 115mg%) and was 
charged with impaired and over 80mg%. 
Ontario Court of Justice
At trial the accused argued the demand was not 
given forthwith. The judge said forthwith meant 
within a reasonable time. After considering  all of the 
circumstances before the demand was given, the 
judge found there was no realistic opportunity for 
the accused to consult counsel. His s. 10(b) Charter 
rights were not breached and a conviction for over 
80mg% was entered. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The court ordered a new trial. In its view, the trial 
judge erred in defining  forthwith. “Forthwith” means 
immediately or without delay, not within a 
reasonable time. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The Crown argued the Superior Court judge applied 
the wrong  test for “forthwith” in s. 254(2). The 
Crown contended that “forthwith” requires only that 
there be compliance with a valid demand before the 
detainee realistically could consult with counsel.! In 
its view, forthwith does not mean “immediately” but 
“within a reasonable time”.! The accused, however, 
submitted that “forthwith” means “immediately or 
without delay,” unless the delay is reasonably 
necessary. In his view, an ASD demand must be 
made forthwith upon the officer forming  the opinion 
that the demand is justified and then the sample 
must also be provided forthwith. 
In determining  the meaning  to be given to s. 254(2), 
Justice LaForme, speaking  for the unanimous 
Ontario Court of Appeal, first described the 
provisions purpose:
Parliament created a two-step detection and 
enforcement procedure in s. 254 that necessarily 
interferes with rights and freedoms guaranteed 
by the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.! First, s. 254(2) authorizes peace 
officers, on reasonable suspicion of alcohol 
consumption, to require drivers to provide 
breath samples for testing on an ASD.! These 
BY THE BOOK:
ASD Demand: s. 254(2) Criminal Code
If a peace officer has reasonable 
grounds to suspect that a person has 
alcohol ... in their body and that the 
person has, within the preceding 
three hours, operated a motor 
vehicle ... the peace officer may, by demand, 
require the person ... (b)  to provide forthwith a 
sample of breath that, in the peace officer’s 
opinion, will enable a proper analysis to be 
made by means of an approved screening 
device and, if necessary, to accompany the 
peace officer for that purpose.
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screening  tests, at or near the roadside, 
determine whether more conclusive testing is 
warranted.! !
Second, s. 254(3) allows peace officers who 
have the requisite reasonable and probable 
grounds – usually obtained from the ASD test – 
to demand breath samples for a more conclusive 
breathalyzer analysis.! Breathalyzers determine 
precisely the alcohol concentration in a person’s 
blood and thus permit peace officers to ascertain 
whether the alcohol level of the detained driver 
exceeds the limit prescribed by law.!
As our courts have often noted, this two-step 
process provides the police with a powerful tool 
to curtail, investigate and prosecute drinking  and 
driving  related offences. The deaths and 
substantial societal costs associated with 
drinking  and driving fully justify the existence of 
this procedure. [reference omitted, paras. 18-20]
During  the “forthwith” period, a detained person 
can be required to comply with an ASD demand 
despite ss. 8, 9 and 10(b) of the Charter. “So long  as 
the demand is validly made pursuant to s. 254(2) – 
that is, so long  as it is made ‘forthwith’ – for Charter 
purposes there is no unjustified seizure or arbitrary 
detention or breach of the requirement to advise the 
detainee of his or her right to counsel,” said Justice 
LaForme.! “This is because this statutory detection 
and enforcement procedure constitutes a reasonable 
limit on Charter rights, given the extreme danger 
represented by unlicensed or impaired drivers on the 
roads.” 
“Forthwith”
There are implicit and explicit requirements of 
immediacy in s. 254(2). It explicitly requires the 
motorist provide a breath sample “forthwith” and 
implicitly requires that the demand be made as soon 
as the officer forms the reasonable suspicion that the 
driver has alcohol in their body. “The term 
‘forthwith’ in s. 254(2), therefore, means 
‘immediately’ or ‘without delay’ and indicates a 
prompt demand by the peace officer and an 
immediate response by the person to whom that 
demand is addressed,” said LaForme. “However, in 
unusual circumstances ‘forthwith’ may be given a 
more flexible interpretation than its ordinary 
meaning  strictly suggests. ... Consequently, if the 
circumstances dictate that a ‘short delay’ is 
necessary for the officer to obtain an accurate result, 
the officer is justified in delaying  either the making 
of the demand or the administration of the test after 
the demand.” An example of a reasonable delay 
would be waiting  15 minutes where the officer 
believes that the ASD reading  would be inaccurate 
(eg. recent alcohol consumption). This example, 
however, should not be taken to mean that an officer 
is never required to make an ASD demand as soon 
as they form the reasonable suspicion that the driver 
has alcohol in their body.! In summary, the Court of 
Appeal concluded there were five things to consider 
in assessing  the immediacy requirements in s. 
254(2):
1. “the analysis of the forthwith or immediacy 
requirement must always be done contextually. 
Courts must bear in mind Parliament’s intention 
to strike a balance between the public interest 
in eradicating  driver impairment and the need to 
safeguard individual Charter rights.
! !
2. “the demand must be made by the police officer 
promptly once he or she forms the reasonable 
suspicion that the driver has alcohol in his or 
her body. The immediacy requirement, 
therefore, commences at the stage of reasonable 
suspicion.!
3. “‘forthwith’ connotes a prompt demand and an 
immediate response, although in unusual 
circumstances a more flexible interpretation 
may be given.! In the end, the time from the 
formation of reasonable suspicion to the making 
of the demand to the detainee’s response to the 
demand by refusing  or providing  a sample must 
be no more than is reasonably necessary to 
enable the officer to discharge his or her duty as 
contemplated by s. 254(2).!
“So long as the demand is validly made pursuant to s. 254(2) – that is, so long as it is made 
‘forthwith’ – for Charter purposes there is no unjustified seizure or arbitrary detention or 
breach of the requirement to advise the detainee of his or her right to counsel.”
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4. “the immediacy requirement must take into 
account all the circumstances.! These may 
include a reasonably necessary delay where 
breath tests cannot immediately be performed 
because an ASD is not immediately available, or 
where a short delay is needed to ensure an 
accurate result of an immediate ASD test, or 
where a short delay is required due to 
articulated and legitimate safety concerns. These 
are examples of delay that is no more than is 
reasonably necessary to enable the officer to 
properly discharge his or her duty.! Any delay 
not so justified exceeds the immediacy 
requirement.
5. “one of the circumstances for consideration is 
whether the police could realistically have 
fulfilled their obligation to implement the 
detainee’s s. 10(b) rights before requiring  the 
sample.! If so, the “forthwith” criterion is not 
met.
Here, the Superior Court judge was too rigid in 
applying  the “forthwith” definition of “immediately” 
or “without delay” and not giving  it a flexible 
approach when required. The trial judge’s definition 
of “within a reasonable time” was also wanting  if 
applied too strictly:
While many if not most cases will permit 
proceeding without delay, some circumstances 
will require a flexible approach.!A short delay if 
r ea sonab ly nece s sa r y f o r t he p rope r 
administration of the roadside test must be 
accommodated if the purpose of the legislative 
provision is to be realized.!
In my respectful opinion, articulation of the 
precise linguistic equivalent for “forthwith” is 
less important than a careful consideration of all 
the circumstances of the particular case.! The 
legal context for this consideration is the 
objective that “forthwith” sets out, namely a 
prompt demand and an immediate response, 
ultimately taking no more than the time 
reasonab ly neces sa ry fo r the p rompt 
performance of the steps contemplated by s. 
254(2). [paras. 51-52]
In this case, the time that elapsed between the stop 
and the sample - about 17 minutes - was reasonably 
necessary to enable the officer to do his 
duty.!“Because [the accused] had just sped away, the 
officer understandably conducted a limited search of 
his car for weapons, had a short conversation with 
him about his alcohol consumption, and checked 
out the assertion that there was another person in 
the car with him,”! said Justice LaForme. “Having 
formed the required reasonable suspicion, the officer 
made the demand and [the accused] provided the 
sample.!In these circumstances, the 17 minute delay 
was reasonably necessary for the officer to properly 
perform his task.” The Crown’s appeal was allowed 
and the accused’s conviction was restored. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
REQUEST TO EXIT VEHICLE AT 
BORDER NOT A DISGUISED 
SOBRIETY TEST
R. v. Brode, 2012 ONCA 140
The accused stopped his car at a 
Canada Customs booth and was 
asked routine questions by a Border 
Services Officer (BSO) about his 
citizenship, the length of time he 
spent outside of Canada and his place of 
residence.! The BSO noticed the accused’s speech 
was slurred, his eyes were “a little glossy and red”, 
and there was a “small, faint” smell of alcohol on his 
breath.! When asked about drinking, the accused 
said he had consumed three drinks. The accused 
turned his car off and handed over the keys as 
requested. A BSO designated under the Customs Act 
(CA) with powers to respond to suspected impaired 
drivers was called. The accused was directed out of 
his car and stumbled as he exited. He had bloodshot 
eyes, smelled of alcohol, and spoke in a “loud and 
cocky” manner.! The designated BSO formed the 
opinion that the accused’s ability to drive was 
impaired. He was arrested, cautioned, advised of his 
s. 10(b) Charter rights and subsequently provided 
breath tests. He was charged with impaired 
operation of a motor vehicle and over 80mg%.
Ontario Court of Justice
At trial the accused was convicted of impaired 
driving  on the basis of the BSO’s evidence, including 
the signs of impairment observed while he exited his 
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car at their direction. This was so, 
despite the accused being  detained 
but not yet advised of his rights under 
s. 10(b) of the Charter when the 
observations were made. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused argued the significant 
evidence forming  the basis for the 
impaired conviction - stumbling, 
bloodshot eyes, odour of alcohol and 
speaking  in a “loud and cocky” 
manner - related to observations 
made between the time he was directed to get out of 
the car and the time when his s. 10(b) rights were 
given. He suggested that when these observations 
were made, the BSOs were engaged in conduct 
designed to gather evidence of impairment against 
him and were not obtained while carrying  out 
authorized duties. The appeal judge, however, 
disagreed and found the impaired evidence was 
comprised of general observations the designated 
BSOs made while conducting  authorized duties.!The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed and his conviction 
was upheld. ! !
Ontario Court of Appeal
Th accused appealed arguing  that designated BSOs 
have no authorized investigative powers at common 
law or by operation of statute. In his view, the 
powers of BSOs are narrow in scope and they do not 
have the powers of police officers. He submitted that 
BSOs cannot take steps to gather indicators of 
impairment before making  a demand for breath or 
blood samples and their observations are limited to 
those made during  the normal discourse involving 
customs matters. Thus, the BSOs were engaged in 
unauthorized conduct when they made their 
impairment observations and this evidence was not 
admissible to prove impairment. Further, he 
submitted that even if designated BSOs had the 
authority to take steps to gather indicia of insobriety, 
their request that he get out of his car (and seeing 
him stumble) was a sobriety test itself and could not 
be used as evidence because it was obtained before 
his s. 10(b) rights were given. 
The Court of Appeal examined the 
CA, which regulates the movement 
of goods and people into and out 
of Canada, and the powers of 
BSOs pursuant to s. 163.5. Under 
the CA, people entering  Canada 
are required to present themselves 
to officers at the border. The 
officers are empowered to detain 
and question them, perform 
searches, and examine and seize 
goods. Designated BSOs have 
additional powers - including 
arrest and breath demand authorities - in order to 
respond to suspected impaired drivers crossing  the 
border into Canada. Justice Epstein summarized the 
powers of BSO’s as follows:
In relation to any criminal offence under any Act 
of Parliament, a designated BSO under the 
Customs Act has the powers and obligations of a 
peace officer under ss. 495-497 of the Criminal 
Code to arrest without a warrant a person where 
there are reasonable and probable grounds to 
believe he or she has committed an indictable 
offence or is about to commit such an offence.!A 
designated BSO may also, where he or she has 
reasonable grounds to suspect impaired 
operation of a motor vehicle, make demands for 
samples of a person's breath, or in some 
circumstances samples of a person’s blood. The 
designated BSO may also require that a person 
accompany him or her for the purpose of taking 
samples, and may detain that person until they 
can be placed in the custody of a peace officer.
There is a limitation on these powers: a 
designated BSO may not use any power 
conferred for the enforcement of the Customs 
Act for the sole purpose of looking for evidence 
of a criminal offence under any other Act of 
Parliament. [paras. 25-26]
Although Justice Epstein recognized that s. 163.5 of 
the CA did not expressly give designated BSOs the 
power to take steps to gather evidence of insobriety, 
such power was found in the ancillary powers 
doctrine, grounded in the common law and codified 
in s. 31(2) of the Interpretation Act, which states: 
“Where power is given to a person, officer or 
“A designated BSO may 
also, where he or she has 
reasonable grounds to 
suspect impaired operation 
of a motor vehicle, make 
demands for samples of a 
person's breath, or in some 
circumstances samples of a 
person’s blood.” !
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functionary to do or enforce any act or thing, all 
such powers as are necessary to enable the person, 
officer or functionary to do or enforce the doing  of 
the act or thing  are deemed to be also given.” BSOs 
do not, however, share the same general duty that 
police officers have in preventing  crime and 
protecting  life and property. Thus, BSOs do not have 
the complete set of ancillary police powers that flow 
from that general duty. But the common law 
investigative powers for police officers do apply to 
designated BSOs exercising  their authority under s. 
163.5. Therefore, the designated BSOs had the 
power to take reasonable steps in order to determine 
whether grounds existed for a s. 254 demand:
It is clear that through the s. 163.5 amendments 
to the Customs Act, Parliament intended to 
con fe r au tho r i t y on BSOs , so f a r a s 
constitutionally permitted, to prevent the 
impaired operation of motor vehicles at entry 
points into Canada - a duty indistinguishable 
from that held by police officers to prevent the 
impaired operation of motor vehicles within 
Canada.!It follows, in my view, that the power to 
gather evidence of insobriety is necessary to 
enable designated BSOs to comply with the 
impor tant obl iga t ions associa ted wi th 
responding  to the significant threat of harm 
posed by motorists suspected of being impaired 
as they drive their vehicles into Canada.!  In the 
limited circumstances of their authority under 
the Customs Act, insofar as designated BSOs 
have the same obligations as police officers, so 
too should they have the same ancillary 
investigative powers.
This conclusion is further supported by the 
illogical outcome that would ensue if the 
restrictive interpretation suggested by the 
{accused] were to ensue.!Without the power to 
gather evidence of sobriety many individuals 
would unnecessarily be subjected to breath or 
blood sample demands in circumstances where 
less intrusive and less costly investigative steps 
may prove that initial concerns regarding 
potential impairment were not warranted.
... ... ...
It follows that at the time of the [accused’s] 
detention, the designated BSOs, acting  pursuant 
to their s. 163.5(3) authority to fulfill their duties 
and obligations under ss. 254, 256 and 495-497 
BY THE BOOK:
Designated BSOs: s. 163.5 Customs Act
Powers of designated officers
(1)!In  addition  to the powers conferred on 
an officer for the enforcement of this Act, 
a designated officer who is at a customs 
office and is performing  the normal duties 
of an  officer or is acting in accordance with section 
99.1 has, in  relation to a criminal offence under any 
other Act of Parliament, the powers and obligations of a 
peace officer under sections 495 to 497 of the Criminal 
Code, and subsections 495(3) and 497(3) of that Act 
apply to the designated officer as if he or she were a 
peace officer.
Impaired driving offences
(2)! A designated officer who is at a customs office 
performing  the normal duties of an officer or is acting  in 
accordance with section 99.1 has the powers and 
obligations of a peace officer under sections 254 and 
256 of the Criminal Code. If, by demand, they require a 
person to provide samples of blood or breath under 
subsection 254(3) of that Act, or to submit to an 
evaluation under subsection 254(3.1) of that Act, they 
may also require the person to accompany a peace 
officer referred to in paragraph (c) of the definition 
“peace officer” in section 2 of that Act, for that purpose.
Power to detain
(3)! A designated officer who arrests a person in the 
exercise of the powers conferred under subsection (1) 
may detain the person until the person can be placed in 
the custody of a peace officer referred to in paragraph 
(c) of the definition “peace officer” in section 2 of the 
Criminal Code.
Limitation on powers
(4)! A designated officer may not use any power 
conferred on the officer for the enforcement of this Act 
for the sole purpose of looking  for evidence of a 
criminal offence under any other Act of Parliament.
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of the Criminal Code, had the same inferred 
ancillary investigative powers as police officers 
who detain a motorist under s. 48(1) of the 
Highway Traffic Act. [paras. 45-48]
The step taken in directing  the accused to get out of 
his vehicle in order to gather additional indicators of 
his sobriety was reasonable. It was not intended as a 
sobriety test itself. The observations made as the 
accused exited his vehicle, even in response to the 
officer’s direction, was not compelled, direct 
participation in a roadside test. Thus, evidence 
gathered in taking  this step was not conscriptive in 
nature such that it was inadmissible to prove 
impairment. “In my view, this evidence does not 
support a finding  that the officers required the 
[accused] to get out of his car for the purpose of 
using  his actions while exiting  the car as a sobriety 
test,” said Justice Epstein. “The evidence is more 
indicative of the officers’ requesting  that the 
[accused] get out of the car so that once he was 
outside they could question him and gather 
indicators of insobriety.”
The Court of Appeal also rejected the argument that 
differences between the legal rights of individuals 
detained by police within Canada and those 
detained by BSOs at border crossings were relevant 
in determining  the admissibility of the evidence in 
this case. Although it is an offence under the CA to 
fail to answer truthfully any question posed by a 
BSO or to interfere with, molest, hinder, or prevent a 
BSO who is exercising  their lawful authority, this 
was of no consequence. The evidence of impairment 
comprised of general observations made while the 
designated BSOs were engaged in authorized 
activities. Such observations were admissible to 
prove impairment.! However, the Court of Appeal 
cautioned that in other circumstances, should they 
arise, the differences between the legal rights of 
individuals detained and questioned as part of an 
impaired driving  investigation at the border and 
those detained for the same purpose within Canada 
may be a relevant consideration in considering  the 
admissibility of evidence of impairment. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
DRIVING INTENT NOT 
REQUIRED FOR DE FACTO ‘CARE 
OR CONTROL’
R. v. Andersen, 2012 SKCA 37! !! !! !! !! !! !
At 4:20 am the police found the 
accused sleeping  while sitting  in the 
driver’s seat of his parked vehicle 
with its headlights on and engine 
running. They also saw vomit on the 
driver’s side door and on the ground below it. They 
tried to rouse the accused by knocking  on the roof of 
his vehicle and loudly announcing  their presence, 
but he simply gestured at them with a middle finger, 
indicating  they should leave. He then opened the 
passenger-side window but, when an officer reached 
in to unlock the door, closed it and nearly caught the 
officer’s arm in it. The officers then directed him to 
unlock the vehicle’s doors and threatened to break 
one of the vehicle’s windows if he did not do so. 
When he failed to unlock the doors, the officers 
struck the passenger-side window. The accused 
unlocked his driver’s door, jumped out of his vehicle 
and went after one of the officers. He was subdued, 
read his rights and subsequently provided two 
breath samples; 110 mg% and 100mg%. 
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
At trial the accused testified he had no intention to 
drive his vehicle but merely wanted to sleep off his 
intoxication before driving  home. He said that after 
consuming  16 beers at a community supper, he 
entered his vehicle, sat in the driver’s seat, started 
the engine, turned the heater on maximum (because 
it was cold) and went to sleep almost immediately. 
He also said he was feeling  sick, rolled the window 
down and vomited. But he couldn’t remember 
anything  else until he was shoved against his car by 
the officers. He could not recall locking  his doors, 
when he started his car, nor rolling  down (or up) the 
passenger window when the officer knocked on it. 
He also testified that to put his vehicle in motion he 
would need to depress the brake pedal and push in 
a button on the gearshift. Although the accused did 
not have the intention to drive when he entered the 
vehicle, the trial judge found that his subsequent 
actions in starting  the vehicle, pressing  the brake 
and starting  the engine gave him the immediate 
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ability to set the vehicle in motion through 
inadvertence. This amounted to “care or control” 
and the accused was convicted of over 80mg%. The 
impaired driving charge was stayed.
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
On appeal the accused’s conviction was overturned 
and an acquittal was entered. In the appeal judge’s 
view, the accused was not in “care or control” 
because there was “minimal or no risk” that he 
would have intentionally set his vehicle in motion 
and no more than a “negligible risk” he would have 
inadvertently set it in motion. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed contending  that the accused 
was in “care or control.” In its view, the accused 
used the vehicle’s “fittings and equipment,” or 
conducted himself with respect to his vehicle, in a 
manner that involved a risk that it could be set in 
motion thereby creating  a danger to the public or 
property. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal agreed, 
finding  the mischief targeted by the “care or control” 
offence is the risk of intentionally or unintentionally 
putting  a vehicle in motion at a time when doing  so 
might have endangered the public or property. “Acts 
of ‘care or control,’ short of driving, are acts which 
involve some use of a motor vehicle or its fittings 
and equipment, or some course of conduct 
associated with a motor vehicle which would 
involve a risk of putting  the vehicle in motion so that 
it could become dangerous,” said Justice Caldwell 
delivering  the Court’s opinion. “Practically speaking, 
the risk of danger will be established where the 
evidence indicates the accused might have 
intentionally or inadvertently put the vehicle in 
motion, or both”:
In my respectful opinion, the risk of danger in 
this case was real and evident. [The accused] 
was intoxicated. [He] occupied the driver’s seat 
of his vehicle. [His] vehicle was not disabled in 
any way, was running and was parked in a 
public parking area and, therefore, could have 
been easily put into motion by simply depressing 
the brake and engaging the gear shift (regardless 
of how many discrete steps one might 
characterise this as taking). I find no fault with 
the trial judge’s conclusion that, given [the 
accused’s] intoxicated state, these circumstances 
necessarily involved a risk that [he] could have 
inadvertently set his vehicle in motion, or that 
[he] could have, if he awoke, intentionally set 
his vehicle in motion.
In my opinion, the risk that [the accused] could 
have inadvertently put his vehicle in motion is 
manifest in the evidence of his disorderly 
conduct upon being roused by the police 
(whether due to his admitted intoxication or, as 
the summary conviction appeal court judge 
found, because he was “dazed” or “does not 
wake easily”). Furthermore, in this analysis of 
the risk involved, it is critically important that 
[the accused] testified he had intended to drive 
home after he had slept off his intoxication in his 
vehicle. I say this even though an intention to 
drive is not an essential element of the offence ... 
and [the accused’s] decision was more sensible 
than the alternative of driving  off immediately. 
Regardless, [the accused’s] stated intention to 
drive home after he had sobered up is relevant to 
the risk assessment required in “care or control” 
cases because it is evidence of a risk that he 
could have put his vehicle in motion at a time 
when doing so could create a danger to the 
public or to property. Indeed, on the record in 
this case, the risk is readily apparent since [the 
accused] testified that when he was awakened 
by the police he judged himself “completely 
sober”; yet, over an hour later, his blood alcohol 
readings still exceeded the proscribed limit. 
[paras. 17-18] 
The accused had been in de facto “care or control” 
of his motor vehicle while his blood alcohol content 
exceeded the legal limit. The Crown’s appeal was 
allowed, his acquittal was set aside and his 
conviction restored.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“[A]cts of ‘care or control,’ short of driving, are acts which involve some use of a motor vehicle 
or its fittings and equipment, or some course of conduct associated with a motor vehicle which 
would involve a risk of putting the vehicle in motion so that it could become dangerous.”
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UNDERCOVER OPERATION 
WOULD HAVE CONTINUED 
WITHOUT INVALID WIRETAPS
R. v. Mack, 2012 ABCA 42
!!
Af ter the accused repor tedly 
confessed to killing  his roommate, 
pol ice in i t ia ted an ex tens ive 
undercover investigation supported 
by wiretap authorizations in order to 
determine the extent of his involvement. During  the 
operation, the accused acknowledged that he was 
involved in an incident where somebody died. He 
later admitted that he shot the victim with a .223 or 
Mini-14 five times: four times in the chest and once 
in the back. He also said that he still had the gun 
that he used and that he burned the body over two 
days to ensure that nothing  was left to be identified. 
He then took one of the undercover officers to a fire 
pit located on his father’s property and told him that 
this was the location where he had burned the body 
and spread the ashes. Within a few days he repeated 
the same story to an undercover crime “boss” during 
a “Mr. Big” operation. These statements were 
recorded under the wiretap authorization. Police 
then conducted a search of the fire pit and found 
fragments of bones and teeth belonging  to the victim 
as well as shell casings later determined to have 
been fired from a rifle seized from the accused’s 
home. He was arrested and charged with first degree 
murder. 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The two confessions to undercover police officers 
formed part of the evidence at trial. Although the 
accused acknowledged that he twice confessed to 
undercover police agents that he killed his 
roommate, he said he lied when he made these 
statements. He testified that he was under the 
mistaken impression that he was being  recruited into 
a criminal organization and that the confession was 
necessary to gain acceptance into it. He said he 
needed the money and felt that the organization 
would look after him. He also said that he was 
afraid for his own safety. The judge accepted the 
Crown’s concession that the wiretap authorizations 
lacked investigative necessity and therefore 
breached s. 8  of the Charter. The wiretaps were 
excluded. However, the testimony (or viva voce 
evidence) of the undercover police officers 
regarding  the two confessions was admitted. 
Although there was a temporal connection between 
the invalid wiretaps (obtained from a Charter 
breach) and the confessions, there was no causal 
connection or links between them. The wiretaps did 
not drive the undercover operations and any causal 
connection was so remote as to be insignificant. 
Thus, the statements were not obtained in a manner 
that breached the Charter. A jury found the accused 
guilty.
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his conviction arguing, 
among  other grounds, that his statements made to 
the undercover police officers should not have been 
admitted because they were obtained as a result of a 
s. 8 Charter breach. In his view, the trial judge erred 
by finding  that causal connections between the 
confessions and the wiretaps were required and that 
any such causal connection was insufficient. 
Furthermore, he also submitted that the trial judge 
erred in his instructions to the jury by failing  to give 
a clear sharp warning  as to the dangers of relying  on 
the evidence of the undercover operation.
!
Causal Connection
!
The Alberta Court of Appeal concluded that the trial 
judge did not err. Although a strict causal 
connection between a breach and a subsequent 
statement is not required, causation as part of the 
analysis into whether evidence was obtained in a 
manner that violated the Charter has not been 
rejected entirely. A connection between a breach 
and a statement which is merely remote or tenuous 
will not suffice. In this case, the undercover 
operation would have continued without the 
wiretap authorization. The information coming  from 
the wiretaps was not used to generate the scenario, 
but only assured how the operation was running  and 
ensured officer safety. Even if the wiretap 
information was used to generate any of the 
scenarios, the scenarios were not linked to the 
accused’s ult imate confessions. “The first 
[confession] spontaneously occurred outside the 
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context of an intended scenario,” said the Court of 
Appeal. “The second [confession] was due to the use 
of the generic ‘Mr. Big’ or ‘crime boss’ model, which 
would have proceeded even in the absence of the 
wiretaps and was in no way informed by the 
information derived from the unlawful wiretaps.” 
!
“Mr. Big” Scenario
!
The undercover police investigation, which followed 
a model commonly referred to as a “Mr. Big” 
scheme was described as follows:
This involved an undercover police officer 
gaining  the trust of a target, in this case the 
[accused], using a pseudonym. Once that trust is 
established, the undercover operator elevates the 
relationship by testing the target through mock 
scenarios to assess the target’s willingness to 
engage in criminal activities, often for modest 
monetary gain. If the target seems willing, the 
operator continues to elevate the target’s 
involvement with the promise of joining  a 
criminal organization. As part of the ruse, the 
target is invited to enter into the purported 
criminal organization, but only under the 
promise that he share his criminal history with 
the “boss” of the organization, to ensure that his 
admission will not bring undue “heat” to the 
organization. [para. 27]
In the accused’s view, the trial judge should have 
instructed the jury better on both the dangers of 
relying  on the undercover operators’ testimony in 
the context of the “Mr. Big” operation and the 
reliability of his confession to police. He suggested 
that a judge must advise the jury that such 
statements are inherently unreliable and it is 
dangerous to rely on such evidence. But the Alberta 
Court of Appeal disagreed. All that is necessary is 
that the jury understand that the accused may have 
lied out of fear for his own safety, desire for money 
or both. In this case, the trial judge did warn the jury 
that they must carefully assess the evidence relating 
to the accused’s confession in light of the pressures 
placed on him during the “Mr. Big” scenario:
[The judge] cautioned [the jury] to carefully 
examine the evidence, both with regard to what 
the [accused] said to the undercover police 
officers and whether the statements were true. 
The trial judge advised the jury of the danger 
that the [accused] lied when he admitted to the 
offence, because of intimidation, fear, or merely 
a desire to become part of the organization for 
monetary reasons. The jury was alive to the 
fundamental issue, namely the reliability of the 
[accused’s] confessions to police, in the context 
of the evidence regarding the nature of the 
undercover operation. [at para. 50]
!
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.!! 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca! !! ! ! 
POLICE NEED NOT PROVE, 
BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT, THAT EVIDENCE WILL BE 
RECOVERED
R.!v.!Morgan & Smith,!2012 ONCA 28
Three masked men, armed with a gun 
and machetes, invaded an apartment 
and robbed the occupants, stealing 
cellular telephones, electronic 
equipment and various pieces of 
identification.! The police were called immediately 
after the perpetrators left the apartment and arrived 
shortly thereafter. As a result of their investigation, 
the police obtained a warrant to search a residence 
and, in the accuseds’ bedrooms, found property 
taken from the apartment during  the robbery, 
including  pieces of identification belonging  to the 
victims.!They also found clothing  stained with blood 
containing one of the victim’s DNA.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
At trial the accuseds argued that their s. 8  Charter 
rights were breached and the evidence seized as a 
result of the search warrant should be excluded 
under s. 24(2). The judge found the information to 
obtain (ITO) the warrant contained “extensive 
misinformation, misleading  information and 
incomplete evidence.” He concluded that there had 
been a clear and deliberate breach or, at the very 
least, that the police conduct showed a reckless 
disregard of their obligation to make full and frank 
disclosure in the ITO.!Once he stripped the ITO of 
its erroneous and tendentious assertions there was 
insufficient credible and reliable evidence to find 
reasonable grounds upon which the search warrant 
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could have been issued. The warrant was therefore 
invalid and the evidence was excluded under s. 
24(2). The accuseds were acquitted. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The Crown challenged the trial judge’s ruling 
contending, among  other grounds, that, even after 
removing  any misstatements in the ITO, sufficient 
evidence supporting  the issuance of the search 
warrant remained. Justice Rouleau, writing  the Court 
of Appeal’s decision, agreed. “Even where the ITO 
contains misleading  or false allegations, the 
reviewing  judge is to determine whether, after 
disregarding  the misleading  or false allegations, 
there remains sufficient evidence to justify issuing 
the search warrant,” he said in concluding  that there 
was reliable and relevant evidence upon which the 
warrant could have been issued. Here, there was 
sufficient evidence to support the issuing  judge’s 
decision that there were reasonable grounds to issue 
the search warrant based on the following 
connections:
a connection between the searched 
residence and the robbery.  About 30 
minutes after the robbery, Bell Canada was 
able to place one of the stolen cellular 
telephones equipped with GPS capabilities 
within 100 meters of an intersection. The 
police attended at this location where it was 
snowing  heavily and observed fresh footprints 
in the snow on the street located directly in 
front of the accuseds’ residence which was 
located at this intersection. The stolen cellular 
telephone’s location and the fresh footprints 
provided a basis for inferring  a connection 
between the accuseds’ home and the robbery.
a connection between the accused Morgan 
and the robbery.  The accused Morgan 
matched the victims’ general description of 
the perpetrators - black males, approximately 
20 years old with medium builds and 
measuring  between 5 feet 10 inches and 6 feet 
tall.!Morgan was one of only two black men 
who had been to the victims’ apartment to 
buy a small amount of marihuana but the only 
one to match the suspect description. Plus 
Morgan had been seen wearing  a red bandana 
in the same fashion as one of the perpetrators 
during  the robbery.! These facts provided a 
basis for inferring  a connection between 
Morgan and the robbery.
a connection between the accused Morgan 
and the searched residence.  Sometime 
before the robbery, Morgan placed a 
telephone call to the victim from a telephone 
number reg i s te red to the res idence 
searched.! On the morning  following  the 
robbery, a telephone call from that same 
number was received and recorded on the 
telephone. The police followed up on the 
telephone number and confirmed that the 
telephone calls were made from the landline 
telephone number registered to the residence 
with the owner’s surname Morgan.! The police 
concluded that Morgan was living  at the 
residence with relatives. These facts provided 
a basis for inferring  a connection between 
Morgan and the residence searched.
In this case, the ITO was to be viewed as a whole. In 
doing  so, the three critical connections between the 
accused Morgan, the robbery and the residence 
searched were established. The burden was not on 
the police to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
evidence of the robbery would be recovered at the 
residence. Instead, the test was whether there was at 
least some evidence that might reasonably be 
believed on the basis of which the authorization 
could have issued.
When the three connections and other remaining 
facts were viewed in their totality, the trial judge 
should have concluded that the ITO provided 
reliable evidence on which the issuing  judge or 
justice could have issued the search warrant, even 
when stripped of the information that was materially 
inaccurate and incomplete. Further, Morgan did not 
meet his burden to show that, on a balance of 
probabilities, the warrant could not have been 
issued.!
The Crown’s appeal was allowed and a new trial was 
ordered. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Volume 12 Issue 2 ! March/April 2012
PAGE 21
FINDING GUN WAS VALID 
OBJECTIVE OF SEARCH
R.!v.!Malaj,!2012 ONCA 21
!
After being  refused entry into a 
restaurant for not complying  with the 
dress code, a man and his three 
companions were involved in an 
altercation with restaurant security in 
the parking lot. The man, wearing  a leather jacket 
and jeans, brandished a .38 calibre handgun and 
aimed it at the head of the security manager. When 
police were called, the man ran easterly towards a 
nearby tractor-trailer parking  lot.! The gunman was 
described as “white, Russian decent, balding, with 
spiky hair, brown leather jacket and blue 
jeans.”! Police set up a perimeter and saw a male 
matching  the suspect’s description coming  out of a 
bush area. He was trying  to enter the truck parking 
lot but he went back into the bush. Canine and 
tactical officers unsuccessfully searched for the 
suspect for over one hour and 40 minutes. Although 
containment was called off, one officer continued to 
search. As he drove into the driveway of an 
apartment building, about one kilometer northeast of 
the truck parking  lot, he saw the accused in its 
lobby. He noted the accused was wearing  a dark 
leather jacket, blue jeans and had brown spiky hair. 
When he approached the accused he detected a 
strong  odour of wet leather and noted burrs down 
the front of his shirt.! The officer opined that the 
accused was the male they were looking  for. He was 
arrested but not told why.! The officer ordered the 
accused to put his hands on his head and turn 
around.!When he was handcuffed and taken to the 
ground in a prone position, the officer heard a 
“metal clink.” The accused had a loaded handgun, 
cocked and ready to fire, down the front of his pants. 
The accused was advised as to the reason for his 
arrest about 10 minutes later, but no detailed 
conversation occurred during that time. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
At trial on charges of pointing  a firearm, possessing  a 
loaded prohibited firearm and carrying  a concealed 
weapon, the accused argued that his rights under ss. 
8, 9 and 10(a) and (b) of the Charter had been 
breached. In his view, the handgun was inadmissible 
under s. 24(2). He suggested that the arrest was not 
supported by reasonable and probable grounds 
because it was based on a generic suspect 
description and occurred outside the perimeter area 
of the investigation about two hours after the original 
radio broadcast.! Since the warrantless search was 
carried out on the basis of an unlawful arrest and the 
accused was manhandled in the process, it was 
unreasonable. He was not offered any reason for his 
arrest, nor was he advised of his right to consult with 
counsel, which breached his ss. 10(a) and (b) rights. 
The Crown, on the other hand, asserted the arrest 
was based on reasonable and probable grounds, 
which were both subjectively and objectively 
justifiable.!The search was an incident to the arrest 
and, given the highly charged and potentially 
dangerous interaction, was reasonably conducted.
s. 9 Charter - Arbitrary Detention
The trial judge concluded there was no s. 9 Charter 
breach. The arrest was lawful under s. 495(1)(a) of 
the Criminal Code, based on reasonable and 
probable grounds. Not only did the arresting  officer 
believe, in his mind, that there were reasonable 
grounds, a contextual examination of all the 
circumstances surrounding  the arrest and the facts 
known by the arresting  officer provided objective 
justification for that belief. The judge stated:
While the broadcast description of the suspect alone 
may not have formed an  adequate basis for 
establishing reasonable and probable grounds, that 
description, in combination with  all of the other 
facts known to [the officer] taken in  their geographic 
and temporal context, in  my view, gave rise to an 
honest belief that [the officer] had  reasonable and 
probable grounds to arrest the [accused].! That 
personal belief, in  my view, is objectively supported 
by the totality of the facts known to [the officer] 
prior to the arrest.
The circumstances of the arrest follow from very 
serious allegations involving  a suspect brandishing 
and pointing  a handgun in  the parking  lot of a 
restaurant.!Public safety clearly would  be at risk in 
such circumstances.!
Further, the arrest occurred in a highly charged and 
potentially very dangerous situation where both  the 
officer’s and public safety could be at risk.! [paras. 
38-40]
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The judge also rejected the accused’s suggestion that 
an investigative detention, along  with questioning, 
would have been the lawful and proper route to 
take. Such an approach would have been 
unreasonable in the highly dangerous circumstances 
facing  the officer.!Here, the officer “acted swiftly and 
decisively based on objectively justified reasonable 
and probable grounds.” The arrest was lawful and 
there was no s. 9 breach. 
s. 8 Charter - Unreasonable Search
Since the arrest was lawful, the search was 
incidental to that arrest and therefore reasonable. 
The search was directly related to the unlawful 
possession and use of a handgun and locating  it was 
a valid objective of the search.!The judge dismissed 
the accused’s contention that the way he was 
manhandled by police rendered the search 
unreasonable:
It was asserted by the [accused] that the officer’s 
manner of handcuffing  him and placing  him 
prone on the ground was physically highhanded 
and unreasonable. In my view, given the 
constellation of facts discussed above and the 
potentially dangerous circumstances faced by 
the officer, the evidence does not disclose any 
abusive behaviour on the part of the officer.!To 
the contrary, I find that the manner in which the 
[accused] was arrested and secured was entirely 
reasonable.!
The officer was faced with a suspect, who he 
reasonably believed had brandished a handgun, 
and as such it was reasonable in the course of 
arresting  the [accused] to ensure that he was 
restrained, and that he could not have access to 
nor dispose of the handgun.![paras. 49-50]
s. 10(a) Charter - Reason for Arrest
Even though the officer did not advise the accused of 
his s. 10(a) rights prior to or at the time of his arrest, 
he was informed of the reason about 10 minutes 
later. In the circumstances of this arrest, the judge 
concluded that the accused was “promptly” advised 
of the reasons for his arrest as required by s. 10(a). 
Plus, even if the accused’s Charter rights were 
breached, the evidence was nonetheless admissible 
under s. 24(2). The accused was convicted. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused’s further appeal was rejected. In a short 
endorsement dismissing  his arguments, the Court of 
Appeal stated:
The trial judge took all these circumstances into 
account. We find no error in his conclusion that 
they constitute reasonable and probable grounds 
for arrest.!Because of this the stop and the search 
were lawful. 
As for the ss. 10(a) and (b) arguments, there was no 
merit in them.!The accused’s conviction was upheld. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note: Facts taken from the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice decision reported at 2008 CanLII 
43586 (ONSC).
BY THE BOOK:
Powers of Arrest: s. 495(1) Criminal Code
A peace officer may arrest 
without warrant
(a)!a person who has committed 
an indictable offence or who, 
on reasonable grounds, he 
believes has committed or is about to 
commit an indictable offence;
(b)! a person whom he finds committing a 
criminal offence; or
(c)! a person in respect of whom he has 
reasonable grounds to believe that a warrant 
of arrest or committal, in any form set out in 
Part XXVIII in relation thereto, is in force 
within the territorial jurisdiction in which 
the person is found.  
www.jibc.ca
Canada’s leading Public Safety Educator
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PLACING FICTITIOUS 
CRAIGSLIST AD NOT 
ENTRAPMENT
R. v. Chiang, 2012 BCCA 85
From media reports and investigative 
files, police had reason to believe 
that underage females were offering 
sexual services on the Craigslist 
website. Police decided to set up a 
form of "sting" operation by posting  the following  ad 
in its erotic services section:
Sexy, New & Hot
Reply to: freshtna16@gmail.com
Sexy, young tight bodies lookin for fun. In call today 
only, girls from out of town in downtown Victoria area.
Don't miss this you'll be sorry!!
Individuals responding  to the advertisement were 
given information suggesting  that the females were 
underage. Most did not pursue the matter further. 
The accused, however, persisted with efforts to 
obtain sexual services. He was advised in an e-mail 
that two girls, aged 16 and 17, were available. He 
chose the 16-year-old based on a fake photo sent to 
him. In a subsequent phone call he was instructed 
to bring  cash to a meeting  that was to take place in 
a motel parking  lot, where a female undercover 
officer posed as a procurer. He met the undercover 
officer and confirmed he had cash. He agreed the 
sex would not be rough and he was only interested 
in safe sex.!When the accused used the key to enter 
the room, he was confronted by police officers 
present inside and arrested.
British Columbia Supreme Court
The trial judge convicted the accused of 
communicating  for the purpose of obtaining  for 
consideration the sexual services of a person under 
the age of 18 years, contrary to s. 212(4) of the 
Criminal Code. In the judge’s view, the exchange 
between the accused and the female undercover 
officer outside the motel just before he received the 
room key was sufficient to ground a conviction. The 
judge also refused to enter a stay of proceedings, 
rejecting the accused’s entrapment claim. 
CONVERSATION BETWEEN ACCUSED AND FEMALE 
UNDERCOVER OFFICER OUTSIDE HOTEL ROOM
Undercover Officer (M-Mackenzie). Hi, are you Bob?
Accused (B-Bob). Yes.
M. Hi Bob. I am Mckenzie. We were just talking on the phone.
B. Yes.
M. Ok, so did you bring the cash?
B. Yeah. (The police officer testified that "Bob" pulled a roll of $20 bills out of one of his 
shirt pocket and showed it to her.)
M. Great. You don't need to give it to me right now. You can pay later, but I just needed 
to see it.
B. Oh, ok. (Bob put the money back in his pocket)
M. So I just want to go over some of the ground rules with you quickly.
B. Ok.
M. Because [J.] is only 16, there can be no rough play, or rough sex, or anything like 
that.
B. She's only 16? (The officer testified that Bob appeared somewhat shocked)
M. Well yeah, I told you that on the e-mail.
B. I thought that was just a number. I didn't know.
M. Well, yeah, that's how old she is. It's cool. She is a great girl and she's totally good to 
go and she is eager and wants to please.
B. Yeah, but is that alright?
M. Well no - I mean it's not the legal age of 19, but whatever.
B. Oh.
M. There are 16 year olds walking the streets Bob. At least this way we are trying to 
protect them as best we can, which is why you have to meet me first and go over the 
rules because we are looking out for them and their safety, right?
B. No, I'm not like that, I'd never be rough. (The officer testified that Bob appeared 
embarrassed) Do you have some kind of card or ID for me to look at?
M. No, I don't do that Bob. I don't start showing clients my ID.
B. Oh.
M. I don't know what you think you're walking into here Bob, but if you want [the 16 yr. 
old] she's in there and she's a great girl, but if you don't, well, that's up to you. I just 
needed to make sure that everything is all good with you and you understand the 
ground rules of what I've explained already. No rough sex and all that.
B. No, I'm not like that.
M. I'm sure you're not, so it's all cool and if you want [J.], she's in there (indicating to the 
hotel room - giving a head nod). And I'll get the money from you later or leave it with her. 
So, I don't know what you want to do.
B. Ok.
M. So you mentioned online that you were looking for straight sex, right? (The officer 
testified that Bob nodded affirmatively)
M. It's just if you want anything else like a blow job or anal, or anything like that, then I 
have to know about it because I tell her so she knows what to expect, right? Because 
she is so young we are just looking out for her.
B. Where is she?
M. She's in room 147, right there. (The police officer gave a head nod indicating the 
room straight ahead). So once we agree, then I'll give you the key and she'll be waiting.
B. Ok.
M. Ok, so you're in for the $150 for the half hour?
B. Yeah, I'll check it out.
M. Ok, I'll give you the key.
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British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused challenged the trial judge’s entrapment 
ruling, among  other things, arguing  that police 
conduct crossed permissible boundaries. But Justice 
Hall, delivering  the Court of Appeal’s decision, 
disagreed. “The type of crime being  investigated by 
the police in the present case has about it an 
‘inchoate’ quality,” he said. “It is the same type of 
offence as Internet luring  of children for a sexual 
purpose. ...! Modern Internet facilities afford easier 
access to young  people for individuals minded to 
exploit their youth and vulnerability.” In this case, 
“the police had a credibly based belief that conduct 
prohibited by s. 212(4) of the Criminal Code was 
occurring  in their area.” This was consensual 
criminal activity and it can be difficult for the police 
to enlist the cooperation of young  persons who are 
actual or potential victims. The "sting" was designed 
to ferret out people minded to prey on the 
vulnerabilities of young  targets. The erotic services 
section on Craigslist was similar to a geographic 
region targeted in drug  cases, where random virtue-
testing  is permissible as part of a bona fide inquiry 
directed at a circumscribed area where it is 
reasonably suspected that criminal activity is 
occurring. In this case, the police were entitled to 
present any person associated with the Craigslist site, 
whether placing  an ad or responding  to one, with 
the opportunity to commit the s. 212(4) offence and 
they did not entrap the accused in doing  so. Nor was 
the accused induced into committing  the offence at 
the hotel room:
The reach of the investigation was carefully 
limited through the nature of the investigative 
tool employed, specifically an ad on Craigslist 
that spoke of “young  bodies”. Most of the 
persons who responded to the ad resiled from 
further proceeding when there was a suggestion 
of the involvement of underage females. The 
[accused], however, persisted in his efforts to 
obtain sexual services. The interaction between 
the undercover office and the [accused] outside 
the motel room did not involve pressing  and 
persistent conduct. ... The judge made a specific 
finding ... that the undercover officer did not 
“induce” the [accused] to take the room key and 
enter the room. I consider this a reasonable 
finding on the evidence. This is a case that, on its 
facts, is at a considerable remove from the 
“clearest of cases” where a stay of proceedings 
would be available on the basis of the doctrine 
of entrapment. I am in respectful agreement with 
the trial judge that the police conduct in this 
case did not exceed proper investigative limits.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
DELAYING SEARCH FOR 
MISSING GIRL AMOUNTED TO 
OBSTRUCTION
R. v. Quinones, 2012 BCCA 94
A 12-year-old, grade seven female 
elementary student contacted the 24-
year-old accused on an Internet 
website by responding  to the profile 
he had posted. The accused had 
engaged in a sexual relationship with the girl, had 
intercourse with her on a number of occasions and 
had made a video of them having  sex. One morning 
he was awoken by knocking  at his door. Before 
answering  it, he sent the girl into the bathroom with 
his father, who was preparing  to have a shower. It 
turned out to be the police at the door. Officers said 
they were looking  for a missing  child (the girl), but 
BY THE BOOK:
Prostitution of person under eighteen: 
s. 212(4) Criminal Code
Every person who, in any place, obtains 
for consideration, or communicates with 
anyone for the purpose of obtaining  for 
consideration, the sexual services of a 
person who is under the age of eighteen 
years is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years and 
to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a 
term of six months.
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the accused lied three times telling  them she wasn’t 
there. The accused said his father was in the 
bathroom and the police waited around to see. 
When police told the accused the girl’s age, he let 
them open the bathroom door. The accused had 
delayed the search for the victim for some 20-25 
minutes in the hope that police would leave. 
British Columbia Supreme Court
At trial the accused claimed he did not know the girl 
was under 16-years of age. However, he was 
convicted, among  other crimes, of obstructing  peace 
officers under s. 129(a) of the Criminal Code for 
delaying police in searching for the girl. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among  other things, that he 
mistakenly believed the girl was older, did not 
consider her missing  nor a child, and therefore did 
not wilfully obstruct the officers. Plus, he said that 
he sent the girl to the bathroom to keep her safe. The 
British Columbia Court of Appeal, however, 
disagreed. In establishing  the offence of obstruction, 
not only was the Crown required to prove identity 
and the time and place of offence, it was also 
required to prove that:
• the complainants were peace officers;
• they were in the execution of their duties;
• the accused knew they were peace officers in 
the execution of their duties; and
• the accused wilfully obstructed the peace 
officers in the execution of their duties. 
The obstruction offence did not require proof that a 
peace officer had been prevented from the 
execution of their duties. Justice Hinkson, speaking 
for the unanimous Court of Appeal, found it was 
open to the jury to conclude that the accused, 
regardless of his belief of the girl’s age, wilfully 
caused the attending  police officers to delay their 
search of the bathroom for 25 minutes, hoping  they 
would abandon their search for the girl. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
TECHNICIAN'S OBSERVATION 
NOT CONSCRIPTIVE
R. v. Lutchmedial, 2011 ONCA 585
A motorist observed the accused’s 
van swerving  from one lane to 
another.! It went up on the sidewalk 
and almost hit another car.! The 
motorist called 911 and police saw 
the accused swerving  between lanes while traveling 
about 40 km/h.!Its pace of travel was erratic. The van 
would slow down and speed up.!After the accused 
stopped, the police approached and found the car’s 
door open. The accused was in an unresponsive, 
semi-conscious state and looked “extremely sleepy.” 
He was removed from the van and arrested for 
impaired driving  based on the motorist ’s 
information, the manner of driving, and the 
accused’s mannerisms when stopped. He was taken 
to the police station where he was presented to a 
qualified breath technician. The technician noted a 
smell of alcohol on the accused’s breath, bloodshot 
and glassy eyes, slight unsteadiness when walking 
and a very slight slurring  of speech.! Two breath 
samples were taken (94mg% and 85mg%). 
Ontario Court of Justice
The accused argued his rights under ss. 8  and 9 of 
the Charter were breached and all of the evidence 
should be excluded. The trial judge found that the 
police did not have reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that the accused had, as a result 
of the consumption of alcohol, committed the 
offence of impaired driving  under s. 253 of the 
Criminal Code. Therefore, the arrest and demand to 
provide breath samples were unlawful. The 
breathalyzer readings resulting  from the s. 8 breach 
(unreasonable search), as well as the answers to 
certain questions the accused gave as part of, or 
derivative to, the breath testing  were excluded. The 
arrest, however, was not arbitrary under s. 9. 
Although the arrest was unlawful for impaired 
driving, the police could have arrested the accused 
for dangerous driving. The technician’s observations 
did not arise as a result of the s. 8 breaches and they 
were admissible. By combining  the observations 
with the testimony of the arresting  officers, the 
accused was convicted of impaired driving.
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Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused appealed his conviction 
arguing  the trial judge improperly 
drew a distinction between the 
r e su l t s o f t he t e s t s and t he 
observations of the technician. Not 
only was the evidence of the 
breathalyzer tests and statements 
made to the technician inadmissible, 
the accused submitted that the 
technician’s observat ion were 
conscriptive evidence and should 
also have been excluded. But the 
appeal judge concluded that it was 
open to the trial judge to find that the 
technician’s observation arose 
outside of the test. In rejecting  the 
accused’s arguments and upholding 
the impaired driving  conviction, the 
appeal judge stated:
The breathalyzer technician was a police officer 
involved in the continuing investigation which 
arose from the detention that was not 
arbitrary.!The observations he made did not arise 
from the test and were independent of it.! If 
another officer had been involved in the 
investigation, the same or similar observations 
would have been made.!The question of whether 
the evidence was "conscripted" did not properly 
arise.!The evidence did not come as a result of a 
breach of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
and, accordingly, considerations which are 
required by s. 24(2) of the Charter, including 
whether or not the evidence was "conscripted", 
need not be taken into account.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused contended that he was arbitrarily 
detained under s. 9 of the Charter. He continued to 
assert that the observations of his impairment made 
by the breathalyzer technician should be excluded. 
Although he agreed that the initial stop by police 
was lawful due to his “bad driving,” he submitted 
that the police had no grounds to make a breath 
demand because they did not observe the usual 
signs of impairment (such as glassy eyes, alcohol 
odour on breath, slurred speech) and his continued 
detention was therefore arbitrary. Thus, these 
observations were inadmissible. But the Court of 
Appeal, in a short endorsement, ruled 
that the accused had not been 
arbitrarily detained. Furthermore, 
there was a strong  line of authority 
that a police officer’s observations of 
a lawfully detained suspect are not 
conscriptive evidence because they 
are not obtained through the suspect’s 
participation: 
The [accused’s] initial detention was 
lawful pursuant to s. 216(1) of the 
Highway Traffic Act. The lack of 
reasonable grounds to arrest the 
[accused] for impaired driving did 
not convert his detention into an 
arbitrary detention.! The [accused’s] 
continued detention was justified to 
further the investigation into his 
horrendous driving.! The observations of the 
breathalyzer technician were admissible as 
evidence of impairment because they did not 
arise as a result of a Charter violation.! The 
observations made by the breathalyzer 
technician could have been made by any police 
officer at the station.![para. 4]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note: Facts taken from the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice decision reported at 2009 CanLI 
30966 (ONSC).
SEARCH WARRANT CONTAINED 
SUFFICIENT INFORMATION FOR 
EXTRA-PROVINCIAL 
ENDORSEMENT
R.!v.!Tohl,!2012 ONCA 9
As a result of conducting  an 
investigation, including  surveillance, 
Quebec police concluded that the 
accused was supplying  drugs in 
substantial amounts to the Chahwan 
brothers on a regular basis. They had seen him leave 
his apartment and go to the Chahwan residence. 
“The [accused’s] 
continued detention was 
justified to further the 
investigation into his 
horrendous driving.!The 
observations of the 
breathalyzer technician 
were admissible as 
evidence of impairment 
because they did not 
arise as a result of a 
Charter violation.”
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Undercover officers purchased drugs from there. 
They also saw the accused attend a large known 
drug  supplier’s home, pick up some packages and 
then return to his apartment. As a result, a search 
warrant was issued in Quebec to search the 
accused’s Ontario apartment. The warrant was then 
endorsed by an Ontario Justice of the Peace under s. 
11(3) of the Controlled Drug and Substances Act 
(CDSA). 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The trial judge concluded there were ample grounds 
in the information to obtain (ITO) to support the 
Quebec justice issuing  the warrant to search the 
accused's Ottawa home. He found there was a 
sufficient link between drug  activity and the place to 
be searched. There was no s. 8 Charter breach and 
the accused was found guilty of possessing  cocaine 
and marihuana for the purpose of trafficking  and 
possessing proceeds of crime. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused challenged his convictions arguing  the 
trial judge erred in finding  sufficient grounds to issue 
the warrant and that the Quebec warrant was 
endorsed by an Ontario justice without a proper 
record before her. Although the trial judge appeared 
to overstate the evidence about the connection 
between the drug  activity and the accused’s home 
by finding  he left his residence and went directly to 
the Chahwan residence “on a number of occasions,” 
there was still sufficient evidence to establish the 
required link and support the conclusion that the 
accused was the person in control of the apartment. 
As well, police saw him attend his drug  supplier’s 
home, apparently obtain a quantity of drugs and 
return directly to his apartment. Further, the Court of 
Appeal stated:
In addition, there is one other piece of evidence 
in the ITO that, when considered in the light of 
the rest of the evidence, supports an inference 
that there may be evidence of drug  crime 
activity in [the accused’s] home: [the accused] 
has been arrested on drug-related charges before 
and the last time he was, he was found to have 
almost a kilo of cocaine in his possession at his 
home.
Accordingly, and notwithstanding that the trial 
judge overstated the evidence of a direct 
connection between the drug dealing and [the 
accused’] residence, we are satisfied that there 
was sufficient evidence in the ITO from which 
the issuing judge could reasonably have inferred 
that a search of [the accused’s apartment] in 
Ottawa would reveal evidence of criminal 
activity contrary to the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act. [paras. 8-9]
As for the endorsement ground of appeal, the 
Quebec warrant contained sufficient information to 
enable the Ontario justice to conduct her statutory 
duty under s. 11(3) of the CDSA. There was nothing 
to indicate she failed to properly carry out her 
duties. The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note:  Application for leave to appeal was 
filed with the Supreme Court of Canada.
BY THE BOOK:
CDSA Warrant Endorsement: s. 11 
Execution in another province
s. 11(3)! A justice may, where a place 
referred to in subsection (1) is in a 
province other than that in which the 
justice has jurisdiction, issue the 
warrant referred to in that subsection 
and the warrant may be executed in 
the other province after it has been endorsed by a 
justice having jurisdiction in that other province.
Effect of endorsement
s. 11(4)!An endorsement that is made on a warrant as 
provided for in subsection (3) is sufficient authority to 
any peace officer to whom it was originally directed 
and to all peace officers within the jurisdiction of the 
justice by whom it is endorsed to execute the warrant 
and to deal with the things seized in accordance 
with the law.
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POLICE APPROACH WAS NOT 
RANDOM VIRTUE TESTING: 
ENTRAPMENT NOT PROVEN
R. v. Gebremicael, 2012 ONCA 68
In an effort to control street level 
trafficking, a police drug  enforcement 
un i t in i t i a ted an undercover 
operation called “Project Cranked.” 
During  a briefing, an undercover 
officer was advised that Hush Fashions, a clothing 
store, had been identified as a source for powdered 
cocaine. The undercover officer attended at Hush 
Fashions, spoke to the accused, and ordered a pair 
of running  shoes. He also spoke about cocaine. 
When he returned to the store the following  month 
to pick up the shoes, the accused asked the officer 
how he was making  out finding  cocaine. When told 
he was having  difficulty, the accused subsequently 
made arrangements to help the officer make cocaine 
purchases. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
A jury found the accused guilty on two counts of 
trafficking  cocaine. He then sought a judicial stay of 
proceedings arguing  that he was entrapped. He 
believed that he was targeted by police because they 
had unsuccessfully prosecuted him on drug  related 
charges previously. But the trial judge found no 
evidence to support this contention. “A number of 
persons were named as specific targets in ‘Operation 
Cranked’ but the accused was not one of them,” said 
the judge. “However, Hush Fashions was identified 
by the police as a source for powdered cocaine 
[and] it was, therefore, ... permissible for [the 
undercover officer] to approach the [accused] in that 
location and inquire about the purchase of cocaine 
pursuant to a bona fide investigation associated with 
‘Operation Cranked’.” Nor did the police go beyond 
providing  the accused with an opportunity to traffick 
cocaine and induce him into committing  the 
offence. The accused’s stay application was 
dismissed and he was sentenced to 14 months in jail 
and two years probation. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused then argued, among  other grounds, that 
the trial judge erred in holding  that he was not 
entrapped. However, his submission that he was 
randomly virtue tested was again rejected. “The 
evidence of [the undercover officer] is that he 
attended Hush Fashions because it had been 
identified as a source of cocaine,” said the Court of 
Appeal. “This evidence was unchallenged and 
provided the police with a reasonable basis for 
approaching  the [accused], the person who was 
running  the business.” Moreover, the trial judge did 
not err in rejecting  the accused’s contention that he 
was induced into trafficking  cocaine. The accused’s 
appeal was dismissed, his conviction upheld and his 
sentence was found to be fit. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note: Facts taken from the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice decision reported at [2010] O.J. No. 
6192. 
OFFICER HAD REASONABLE 
GROUNDS DESPITE RELYING ON 
EXPIRED ASD
R. v Biccum, 2012 ABCA 80
!
The accused struck two pedestrians 
(a mother and child) who were 
crossing  a highway. An attending 
police officer put the accused, who 
was crying  and distraught, in a 
police car and asked him if he had been drinking. 
He said he had a few drinks after work. But the 
officer could not smell any alcohol on the accused’s 
breath because he was smoking  a cigarette. On the 
officer’s request an approved screening  device (ASD) 
was brought to the scene. It had a sticker on it 
indicating  that it had “expired” at midnight on the 
previous day, some 15 hours earlier, and stated “do 
not use beyond calibration date.” Since all the ASDs 
in the local police office usually expired on the 
same day, the officer concluded there was no other 
device or options available to him and he continued 
the investigation using  the “expired” ASD. The ASD’s 
internal verification process showed no signs of 
malfunctioning. A breath sample that registered a 
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“fail” was taken. A breath demand 
followed and the accused provided 
breath samples exceeding 80mg%. 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
At his trial the accused challenged the 
admissibility of the blood alcohol 
readings, arguing  the officer did not 
have reasonable grounds to demand 
the sample. While the officer had a 
suspicion sufficient to support a demand for an ASD 
sample, the device had “expired” and it was 
therefore not reasonable for him to rely on the “fail” 
reading  in making  the demand for the breathalyzer 
sample. The trial judge, however, admitted the 
breath samples. The fact the ASD’s re-calibration was 
overdue was not evidence that it was inaccurate or 
unreliable. Plus, even without the ASD result, the 
demand was still appropriately made and 
reasonable. A conviction followed. 
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused then argued that it was unreasonable 
for a police officer to rely on an expired ASD in 
taking  a sample under s. 254 of the Criminal Code. 
But a 2:1 majority concluded it was not. The Crown 
had discharged its burden of proving, on a balance 
of probabilities, the factual matrix underlying  the 
demand for the breath test. The objective 
reasonableness of the demand must be assessed 
based on the information known to the officer at the 
time the demand was made. “Even if there was 
evidence on this record that it was later proven that 
the approved screening  device was highly accurate, 
or completely unreliable, that would not affect the 
reasonableness of the demand when made,” said the 
majority. “Facts that were unknown at the time of the 
search, and that were not then reasonably 
anticipated, cannot influence the reasonableness of 
the demand.”
Breath Demands - Reasonable Grounds
For a breath sample demand to be reasonable, the 
officer must have an honest subjective belief that 
they have grounds to make the demand and that 
honest subjective belief must be objectively 
reasonable. In deciding  whether an officer’s 
subjective belief is objectively 
reasonable, a judge is entitled 
to consider a police officer's 
training  and experience. Thus, 
an honest subjective belief of 
an experienced officer, while 
not conclusive, can itself be 
some evidence that the belief 
was objectively reasonable. 
Nevertheless, a police officer's 
testimony still needs to be carefully assessed. 
In this case, the reasonableness of the demand for a 
breath sample was argued almost entirely on the 
ASD’s “expiry.” As the majority noted, “it is an error 
to single out one facet of the entire investigation, 
and base the reasonableness assessment entirely on 
that one consideration. ... 
Obviously, some facts may 
deserve more weight than 
others, but the “expiry” of 
the approved screening 
device is not determinative. 
Reasonableness cannot be 
r e d u c e d t o t h e r i g i d 
insistence on the existence 
or non-existence of any one 
factor.”
In assessing  whether the 
officer’s reliance, at least in 
part, on the expired ASD 
was reasonable, regard to 
the total context of the 
investigation was required. “Reasonableness 
depends on the facts and context, and it would be 
an error of law to reduce it to an inflexible rule of 
law,” said the majority. In assessing  reasonableness 
the majority made the following comments:
• “[T]here is nothing  in the Criminal Code making 
calibration a condition precedent to use of the 
device, nor any provision that its readings are 
conclusive. If the passage of the scheduled 
calibration time is to be treated, automatically 
and invariably, as making  reliance on the 
readings unreasonable, absurd results would 
arise. For example, it would be reasonable to 
“Facts that were unknown at 
the time of the search, and 
that were not then 
reasonably anticipated, 
cannot influence the 
reasonableness of the 
demand.”
“It is an error 
to single out 
one facet of 
the entire 
investigation, 
and base the 
reasonablenes
s assessment 
entirely on that 
one 
consideration.”
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rely on the device one minute before midnight, 
but not one minute after midnight of the 
recalibration date.
• “The expiry of the approved screening  device 
must itself be considered in context. It is 
relevant that the device “booted-up” normally. It 
appeared to be working. In [the officer’s] 
experience, if it was not working  it would have 
likely signaled that. The device was only 15 
hours past its scheduled calibration date. [The 
officer] was investigating  a serious incident, and 
he did not have access to any other device.
• “Since the total factual context must be 
considered, what is reasonable can depend on 
the circumstances faced by the constable. 
Necessity can make reasonable what might 
otherwise be unreasonable. For example, it 
would generally be unreasonable to exit the 
second floor of a building  by jumping  out the 
window. However, if the first floor is on fire, 
jumping  might well become reasonable. 
Likewise, if [the officer] knew that there was 
another unexpired device at the detachment, his 
use of the expired one in his hands might at 
some point be unreasonable. Al l the 
circumstances must be considered together. The 
fact that [the officer] was investigating  a serious 
accident, and had no other device available to 
him is relevant in determining  if his actions 
were objectively reasonable.
• “There was no evidence known to [the officer] 
about the source or meaning  of the need for 
recalibration. He knew that it was a “practice” 
to recalibrate every 14 days. He did not, for 
example, know that the approved screening 
devices became inherent ly unrel iable 
immediately after the recalibration deadline. He 
acknowledged that he did not know exactly 
what would happen to the approved screening 
device if it was not recalibrated in time. In sum, 
[the officer] had no information that the 
approved screening  device was inherently 
unreliable after its recalibration date, nor did he 
have any positive evidence that it remained 
reliable. This is just one factor in the analysis, 
but it does not amount to ... “credible evidence” 
that the “fail” reading was unreliable. 
• “Further, common experience suggests that 
“expiry” and “best before” dates are set within a 
margin of error or safety. When an expiry date is 
set, it is generally acknowledged that a few 
devices will actually fail before the expiry date, 
but that a great many of them will be reliable 
beyond the expiry date. When such expiry dates 
will be relied on to make important decisions, it 
would be counterproductive to set the date at 
the point where a large proportion of the 
devices will already have failed, or where even 
a minute passage of time beyond the set expiry 
date will have serious adverse consequences. It 
is true that on this record there is no evidence 
that the recalibration date on the approved 
screening  device was set having  in mind such a 
margin of error. The only evidence on the record 
about [the officer’s] knowledge on the subject is 
that it was a “practice” to recalibrate every 14 
days.
• “But even if there is no evidence on this record 
about how the recalibration date was set, there 
is clear evidence that [the officer] thought that 
there was a margin of error built in. He 
demonstrated that by his actions in using  the 
device 15 hours past the recalibration date. The 
issue is not whether there is any evidence on 
this record as to whether there is a margin of 
error built into the recalibration date. The issue 
is whether it was unreasonable for [the officer] 
to assume the sufficient continued reliability of 
the approved screening  device beyond that date 
to justify its use in the particular circumstances 
in which he found himself. In the whole context 
of the investigation, would a reasonable 
constable in the shoes of [the officer] have 
found it was reasonable to rely, in part, on the 
“fail” reading?
!
The majority concluded the demand was lawful:
In this case the total factual context made the 
demand for a breath sample reasonable. The 
[accused] had been involved in a serious motor 
vehicle accident on good roads on a clear day. 
He admitted that he had been drinking, although 
had there been any odor of alcohol it was likely 
masked by his smoking. He demonstrated 
physical signs that were consistent with drinking 
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and with his emotional state resulting  from the 
accident. The approved screening device 
registered “fail”. While the device was being 
used past its recalibration date, it was only about 
15 hours later. [The officer] did not have access 
to any other device, and the one he used 
appeared to be working normally. While there 
might have been other investigative techniques 
(such as roadside sobriety tests) available to him, 
that does not make [the officer’s] choice of using 
the approved screening device unreasonable. 
[The officer] did not have to prove a prima facie 
case in order to justify demanding the sample. In 
all the circumstances, there were reasonable 
grounds to make the demand. [reference 
omitted, para. 31]
!
Since the officer had reasonable grounds for 
demanding  a breath sample, the evidence was 
properly admitted and the accused’s appeal was 
dismissed.
A Different View
!
Justice Berger, authoring  a minority opinion, 
disagreed that necessity (a serious accident in a 
remote location) provided objective reasonableness 
and overcame the absence of objective factors: !
It is trite law that the officer must have an 
honest belief that the results of the test were 
reliable and the reasonableness of this belief 
must be objectively supportable.
!
The relevant inquiry, accordingly, is whether 
that objective test is made out on the facts of 
this case. Would a reasonable person ignore 
the label not knowing  the significance of the 
warning  on the label? Would a reasonable 
person realize that the device might not 
properly record the amount of alcohol in the 
suspect’s bloodstream if timely re-calibration 
does not occur?  Is it objectively reasonable to 
rely on a device that says “Do not use beyond 
the calibration date” after that date has come 
and gone? [para. 37-38]
!
Although there was no requirement for the Crown to 
prove that an ASD was working  properly, there was 
no credible evidence to explain why the warning 
label could objectively be ignored. Thus, Justice 
Berger concluded that the officer did not have 
reasonable grounds to demand a breath sample and 
violated the accused’s s. 8  Charter rights in obtaining 
them. However, he would have admitted the 
certificate of analysis under s. 24(2) and dismiss the 
accused’s appeal as well. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
SUPREME COURT TAKES 
LONGER TO DECIDE CASES 
In the “Bulletin of Proceedings: Special Edition, 
Statistics 2001 to 2011” the workload of the 
Supreme Court of Canada was reported. In 2011 the 
Supreme Court heard 70 appeals, up from 65 in 
2010. This was the third lowest number of appeals 
heard by Canada’s top court in a single year during 
the last decade (53 appeals were heard in 2007 and 
65 in 2010). The most appeals heard in the last 10 
years was in 2005 when 93 were brought before the 
Court.
Case Life Span 
The time it takes for the Court to render a judgment 
from the date of hearing  the case dropped from 7.7 
months in 2010 (a 10 year high) to 6.2 months in 
2011. Overall it takes 19 months, on average, for the 
court to render an opinion from the time an 
application for leave to hear a case is filed. This is 
up from the previous year (18.8 months). The 
shortest period of time within the last ten years for 
the Court to announce its decision after hearing 
arguments was 4.0 months in 2003. 
Applications for Leave 
Ontario was the source of most applications for 
leave to appeal at 159 cases. This was followed by 
Quebec (152), British Columbia (76), the Federal 
Court of Appeal (72), Alberta (40), New Brunswick 
(12), Nova Scotia (11), Saskatchewan (10), Manitoba 
(7) and Prince Edward Island (2). No applications for 
leave came from Newfoundland, Northwest 
Territories, Nunavut or the Yukon.
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Appeals Heard 
Of the 70 appeals heard in 2010, Ontario had the 
most of any origin at 20. This was followed by British 
Columbia and the Federal Court of Appeal with 13 
each, Quebec (12), Alberta (5), Nova Scotia (3), 
Manitoba (2) and Saskatchewan and Newfoundland 
with one each. No appeals originated from New 
Brunswick, Northwest Territories, Prince Edward 
Island, Yukon or Nunavut. 
Of the appeals heard in 2011, 50% 
were civil while the remaining  50% 
were criminal. Twelve percent (12%) 
of the criminal cases dealt with 
Charter issues, up slightly from 11% 
in 2010. 
Nineteen (19) of the appeals heard in 2011 were as 
of right. This source of appeal includes cases where 
there is a dissent on a point of law in a provincial 
court of appeal. 
The remaining  51 cases had leave to appeal granted. 
This is where a three judge panel gives permission to 
the applicant for the appeal to be heard. 
Appeal Judgments 
There were 71 appeal judgments 
released in 2011, up slightly from 
69 the previous year. Only eight 
decisions last year were delivered 
f rom the bench whi le the 
remaining  63 were delivered after being  reserved. 
Thirty-six (36) of the appeals were allowed while 40 
were dismissed. In terms of unanimity, the court 
remained the same over the 
previous year. In 2011, 75% of the 
Court’s decisions were unanimous. 
The remaining 25% were split.  
Source: www.scc-csc.gc.ca 
ONTARIO COURT OF APPEAL: 
2011 FAST FACTS 
• Canada’s busiest appellate court.
• Made up of 22 full-time judges (as at December 
2011 there were 20 full-time and three 
supernumerary judges). 
• Appeals were 43% civil, 30% criminal, 22% 
inmate and 5% family. 
• There were 835 appeals heard in 2011, down 
from 1001 in 2010. Of all appeals, 29% were 
allowed while the remaining  71% were 
dismissed. As for criminal appeals, 33% were 
allowed while 67% were dismissed.  
• Has a targeted six-month time period for 
releasing judgments from the time of hearing.
Source: Court of Appeal For Ontario, Annual Report 2011 
BC COURT OF APPEAL: 
2011 FAST FACTS 
• Made up o f 15 fu l l - t ime judges p lus 
supernumerary judges. 
• Delivered 293 written judgments and 103 oral 
decisions on appeals.
• Of all appeals, 39% were allowed while the 
remaining  61% were dismissed. As for civil 
appeals, 42% were allowed while 58% were 
dismissed.  
• Of criminal appeals filed, 48% involved 
conviction, 39% sentence and 13% acquittals 
and other types. For criminal appeals heard, 31% 
were allowed while 69% were dismissed. Drug 
and assault cases formed the largest categories of 
criminal appeals.
• 94% of reserved criminal judgments were 
pronounced within a target six-month guideline. 
• Only one criminal appeal was heard by a five 
judge panel. Three civil appeals involved a five 
judge panel.
Source: B.C. Court of Appeal 2011 Annual Report
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